THE NEW PRUSSIAN PROPOSALS. 
35 
As time passed, it became perfect^ clear to Pitt that there had been 
at no time any chance for the success of his proposed subsidy to Prussia. 
The signing of the Treaty of Basle completely weaned him from his 
inclination toward Prussia, and thereafter he was even more hesitant 
than Grenville of making advances to that power. Grenville, on the 
other hand, though fully as distrustful of Prussian sincerity as formerly, 
came to regard the Prussian court as one that could be bought if the 
price were sufficiently attractive, and on several occasions attempted to 
purchase its aid, not by money, but by promises of territorial acquisi¬ 
tion. In the English Cabinet itself the incident clearly redounded to 
from Stockholm to Berlin expressly for that purpose, dared to offer 100,000 dollars to 
the Countess of Lichtenau for an audience, and a very large sum to the King, if he 
would consent to decline the peace.” Schlosser’s sole authority is the Memoires 
(Vun Homme (VEtat , III, 135-137, drawn from Hardenberg’s papers. Schlosser 
is thoroughly untrustworthy on English politics, for he is both unfamiliar with Eng¬ 
lish sources and exceedingly prejudiced. Sorel asserts that Spencer had opened at 
Berlin suggestions of a subsidy before Hardenberg’s departure for Basle (IV, 255), 
notes Hardenberg’s communication with Malmesbury, at Frankfort, March 16 
(IV, 279), and leaves the impression that Hardenberg did delay affairs at Basle as 
long as he dared. Thus Sorel states positively that the English subsidy plan was 
in the air. Incidentally he confuses Ford Henry Spencer with Earl Spencer, a 
member of the Cabinet, stating that the latter was at Berlin. A comparison of the 
correspondence of Auckland, with whom Spencer was very intimate, and the Drop- 
more MSS. proves conclusively that there was no positive knowledge on the con¬ 
tinent of Pitt’s plan, and that no offer was made to Frederick William II. Thus 
Spencer, far from going to Berlin “ expressly for that purpose,” was chosen for the 
Prussian position as early as September, 1794 (Dropmore, II, 621 ; Grenville to 
Malmesbury, Aug. 16, 1794), and he left Stockholm on December 13, before Pitt 
had brought forward his plan. Spencer, when he reached Berlin, did not even 
know that negotiations were about to be opened at Basle. Auckland, III, 279; 
Spencer to Auckland, Jan. 6, 1795. On February 23 Spencer wrote to the English 
Foreign Office that the Treaty of Basle would surely be signed, Prussia “not 
receiving any offers from England.” Ibid., 287; Spencer to Auckland. The 
resume of the Cabinet situation in the body of this article shows that no decision 
had been reached in England at this time, and no instructions sent to Spencer. 
If, then, Spencer made any opening to Hardenberg, as Sorel states, it was on his 
own initiative solely, and was merely suggestive. On March 30 Spencer wrote to 
Grenville : “ From the present appearance of things on the Continent, I take it for 
granted that it is not the intention of his Majesty’s ministers to prevent, by any 
new overtures or proposals, the final conclusion of the treaty which this Court is 
now negotiating with the French Convention.” Dropmore, III, 561. He also 
asked for a leave of absence, conclusive proof that up to April, 1795, no hint of 
Pitt’s purpose had reached him. The Cabinet decision to make an offer to Prussia 
was reached on April 8. Dropmore, III, 50 ; Grenville to George III. At some 
time between that date and April 17, when the news of the Treaty of Basle reached 
London, instructions were sent to apply to the King of Prussia, as is shown by 
Spencer’s letter to Grenville of April 24. Auckland, III, 298. It also appears from 
the same letter that Spencer had so far carried out his instructions as to secure an 
interview with Frederick William II, but that, already aware of the Treaty of Basle, 
he did not disclose Pitt’s plan, and merely expressed England’s regret at Prussia’s 
action. It is possible that Hardenberg, after his interview with Malmesbury, had 
an idea that England might again come forward with a subsidy. It is probable 
that Spencer did bribe the Countess of Lichtenau in order to secure a personal in¬ 
terview with the King, for such bribery was customary at the Prussian court; but 
it is certain that no opening to the King was made before the Treaty of Basle was 
signed, and that no offer was made at any time. 
