32 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT’S FOREIGN POLICY. 
I 
was instant and determined, and he informed Pitt that in case the plan 
was insisted upon he must resign from the Cabinet. Pitt was much 
agitated at the thought of a rupture with Grenville, though he cannot 
have been unaware that the latter’s inclination to an Austrian alliance 
and his distrust of Prussia would cause him to oppose the project. In 
the last week of February Pitt wrote to Grenville : 
“I have been trying to put together what, according to my ideas, 
should be the instruction on this unfortunate subject of Prussia, and 
have desired a Cabinet to be fixed for twelve tomorrow. I should 
wish much to see 3^011 first, and will be at leisure whenever you please 
at eleven. The more I think on the business the more uneasiness I 
feel at what \’OU seemed likely to determine, and I want much to talk 
it over with 3-011 at large. I cannot help thinking that the real point 
of honour and duty in such difficulties as the present lies the other wa3^; 
and, at all events, I am sure you will not wonder at ni3 r anxiet3 r to tell 
you all that on reflection strikes me.” * 
Grenville’s objections to a Prussian subsidy were drawn up in a long 
memoir,f 'Tn which" he reviewed former relations with Prussia and 
found in them and in the known interests of that state conclusive 
reasons against an English offer of subsidy. He argued that Frederick 
William II and his ministers were untrustworthy, that the mone3' 
offered was not .sufficient, that Prussia’s preponderance in Holland and 
her rivalry with Russia w T ere best served b3 r a French alliance, that 
honest cooperation was not to be hoped for, that Prussia would use an 
offer from England merely to get better terms from France, and that 
Pitt’s government would be discredited at home unless the treaty should 
prove an entire and unqualified success. In the course of his memoir 
Grenville exhibited his conviction that Austria was England’s true 
ally. The real solution of all Prussian polic3q he asserted, was the 
fear of Austria : ‘ ‘ What other clue will so naturally explain the 
whole political conduct of the King of Prussia since the commence¬ 
ment of the war, as a determination to prevent the acquisition of a 
barrier to Austria on that side [the Netherlands], while that object 
was in question ; and afterwards a determination to hinder the recoveiy 
cif those Provinces.” Prussia must be let go that Austria and Russia 
niay be firmly bound to England. “ The hope of uniting those three 
Courts [Prussia, Russia, and Austria] in one common system is one 
which neither our past experience nor any view of their present situation 
and disposition towards each other seem to justify. If this cannot be 
done, the option must be made, and being made, must be adhered to.” 
'-The date of this letter is between Feb. 20 and 28, 1795. Dropmore, III, 25. 
t Ibid ., 26-30. 
