28 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT’S FOREIGN POLICY. 
the withdrawal of Prussia, but as it was gradually developed came to be 
regarded as an alternative proposition to be executed in case of the fail¬ 
ure of Malmesbury’s mission.* In the latter part of July, 1794, Spencer 
and Thomas Grenville were despatched to Vienna, while Mercy received 
orders from Thugut to proceed to London.f As soon as he learned of 
this new negotiation, Malmesbury, already disheartened, definitely gave 
up hope of realizing his object and asked to be recalled. J This was 
not at once granted, Grenville’s purpose being apparently to use his 
known activities as a lever at Vienna, and it was not until October 24, 
some days after the Prussian subsidies had been officially stopped, that 
the recall was sent.§ By that time it was evident that England and 
Austria could not as yet agree upon the terms of a treaty. || Grenville 
had expected to find a willingness at the court of Vienna to accept 
English direction in the conduct of the war, provided only a liberal 
subsidy and a specific guaranty of conquests were granted. Instead, 
his diplomats found a suspicious court and a changeable policy, while 
Grenville was hampered by his very loyalty to his Dutch ally, whose 
preposterous demands for indemnities vexed the Austrian ministers. 
Austria was anxious to exchange the Netherlands for Bavaria, and in¬ 
directly sounded the English ministry on this point, but did not venture 
to propose it openly.^ Other considerations complicated the negotia¬ 
tion, and the English ministry, apparently frightened at the whirlpool 
of diplomacy in which it was in danger of being involved, hastened to 
withdraw its agents. 
A few months later the rapid march of French armies forced England 
to acquiesce in a request for peace by Holland.** It was a time of hu¬ 
miliation for the English government. England had entered upon the 
war fully convinced that a speedy victory would follow the combined 
efforts of the allies, and thus the attention of both Pitt and Grenville 
was at first directed principally to the form of government to be estab¬ 
lished in France and the nature of the indemnities to be secured. The 
essential feature of the English plan was the restitution of Belgium to 
Austria, that it might constitute a bulwark in defense of Holland. It 
* For Pitt’s memoir on the plan, fuly 15, 1794, see Dropmore, II, 599. Thomas 
Grenville to Grenville, Aug. 4, 1794. Ibid., 609. 
f Grenville to Hertford, July 17, 1794. Ibid., 601. 
j Malmesbury to Grenville, Sept. 20, 1794. Ibid., 633. 
\ The subsidies were stopped on October 19. Fora rdsume of the Prussian point 
of view, see Grenville’s note on a memorial presented by Jacobi. Ibid., Ill, 536. 
|| Court and Cabinets, II, 259-317 ; Sybel, III, 248-251. 
1 | Ibid., 248-251. Both Buckingham’s Court and Cabinets and the letters in 
Dropmore (II, 600-640) leave the impression of surprise and dismay at the difficulty 
of the Austrian negotiation and the diversity of subjects to be considered. 
** Cabinet minute of November 18, 1794. Dropmore, II, 646. 
