26 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT’S FOREIGN POLICY. 
assistance to be rendered; but Prussia was bound b3^ other treaties 
to furnish certain stipulated succors to England and Holland, and 
these Lucchesini asserted it was now impossible for her to render longer, 
unless England would grant a subsidy and guarantee Prussia’s Polish 
possessions.* * * § The news reached England September 30. Grenville 
immediately asserted that neither demand could be complied with, but 
Pitt, while agreeing that the Polish guaranty was out of the question, 
was inclined to argue in favor of some sort of subsidy, provided the 
King of Prussia was first made to acknowledge that under existing 
treaties he could not honorably withdraw the troops already in the 
field.f Pitt further suggested that Malmesbury might be sent to 
Berlin to unravel the tangle in which Yarmouth’s lack of ability had 
involved English interests; % but for the moment he yielded his own 
opinion, and in a Cabinet meeting on October 9 both guaranty and 
subsidy were refused, though the language of the note drawn up b}^ 
Grenville was materially softened.§ 
Grenville was already convinced that Prussia had no intention of 
continuing the war, and he objected to the subsidy both on the ground 
that Prussia had no right to ask it, and also because he did not believe 
that it would insure vigorous action by Prussian armies. According^ 
he recalled Yarmouth,|| and only withdrew that recall to please Yar¬ 
mouth, who still believed that he could be of service in Berlin.If But 
the English government had underestimated the strength of the anti¬ 
war party at Berlin. Instead of intimidating the Prussian court by 
insistence on the fulfilment of existing treaties, the English govern¬ 
ment was itself thrown into consternation on the receipt of an angry 
and threatening communication from Jacobi, the Prussian minister in 
London.** Pitt at once reverted to his original plan, and this time the 
Cabinet was with him, while Grenville acquiesced in the proposed 
subsidy, prophesying nevertheless that no good would result from it.ff 
Malmesbury was despatched to Berlin to arrange the terms of a sub¬ 
sidy, but was instructed that the King of Prussia must first be made 
to acknowledge that the existing situation was a casus fcederis under the 
terms of the alliance of 1788. On this point Frederick William II 
* Burges to Grenville, Sept. 30, 1793. Dropmore, II, 430. 
t Pitt to Grenville, Oct. 2, 1793. (Two letters.) Ibid., 433, 434. 
j Pitt to Grenville, Oct. 4, 1793. Ibid., 503. The date given for this letter in 
the MSS. is Feb. 4, 1794, but the context shows that this is an error. The letter is 
exactly 70 pages out of place in the order of arrangement used in the MSS. 
§ Pitt to Grenville, Oct. 10, 1793. Ibid., 441. 
|| Grenville to Yarmouth, Oct. 17, 1793. Ibid., 446. 
^Yarmouth to Grenville, Nov. 6, 1793. Ibid., 453. 
**Yarmouth to Grenville, Nov. 24, 1793. Ibid., 470. 
tt Grenville to Malmesbury, March 7, 1794. Ibid., 516. 
U Grenville to Malmesbury, Nov. 20, 1793. Malmesbury, III, 1. 
