THE PRUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WAR. 
25 
outset of the Revolutionary wars, the influence of Grenville had proved 
all-important in saving the administration from a compromising dec¬ 
laration.* 
THE PRUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WAR. 
October, 1793, to September, 1794. 
At the very moment when England was outlining a plan of treat¬ 
ment for a conquered France, she was confronted with the danger of 
desertion by one of her allies, for Prussia, distracted by troubles in 
Poland, was threatening to withdraw her troops, urging as her excuse 
a bankrupt treasury. Shortly after the declaration of war by France 
Yarmouth had been sent to the continent f with the purpose of decid¬ 
ing upon some common ground of action with Prussia and Austria, 
and on July 14, 1793, he had signed a treaty with Prussia at Mayence, 
pledging both countries to continue in arms against France. J A sim¬ 
ilar agreement with Austria was signed in London, August 30, though 
the latter contained in addition a mutual guaranty of territory as 
against France.§ These treaties amounted to no more than pledges 
of good faith,|| and neither contained any exact specifications of the 
*Fox led the attack upon what he termed Pitt’s monarchical policy. “If we 
look at the declaration to the people of France, the first idea presented by it, 
although afterwards somewhat modified, but again confirmed by the declaration 
of Toulon, is that the restoration to monarchy must be the preliminary to peace.” 
Pari. Hist., XXX, 1260, jan. 21, 1794. The arguments of the opposition on this 
point do not bear the stamp of sincerity. They were put forward more to embar¬ 
rass the government than for any other purpose, for it was impossible for Pitt to 
deny that the restoration of monarchy was at least an object hoped for. To have 
done so would have disgruntled the allies and have lessened the chances of a 
royalist rising in France. In the first debates in the Lords, therefore, Grenville 
wholly evaded the subject, while Pitt in the Commons pursued a like policy until 
pinned down by a direct question from Fox. Later, as the hopes of monarchy 
dwindled, both Pitt and Grenville exalted the wisdom of the ministry in not having 
pledged England to an impossible policy. 
f Yarmouth went to Prussia in Juty, 1793. He thought Prussia could easily be 
brought to more active participation in the war by promising (1) that no idea of a 
Bavarian exchange would be brought forward at the conclusion of the war ; (2) that 
England would “ not endeavour to interrupt the King of Prussia in the enjoyment 
of his new Polish acquisitions ”— i. e a negative guaranty of the partition of 1792, 
Beauchamp to Pitt, June 24, 1793. Dropmore, II, 399. 
JKoch, IV, 236 ; Debrett, I, 18. 
%Ibid., 19 ; Sorel, III, 460. 
|j Bourgoing, III, 161, makes an entirely erroneous statement of the London con¬ 
vention of August 30, 1793. He says that secret articles provided that “ l’Autriche 
regevait comme compensation de ses sacrifices pendant la guerre, une indemnity 
territoriale aux depens de la France, a savoir, la Lorraine, PAlsace, la Flandre; 
elle renon£ait a toute pretention sur la Baviere, et l’Angleterre en echange lui 
garantissait la possessione des provinces beiges.” The Dropmore letters disprove 
this and in fact show that while exact stipulations were under discussion they 
were all postponed because of the difficulty of reaching an agreement upon Dutch 
demands for indemnities. See also Morton Eden to Auckland, Nov. 16, 1793, 
Auckland, III, 144, and Auckland to Van der Spiegel, Jan. 24, 1794, ibid. , 173. 
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