WAR WITH FRANCE. 
21 
V 
great change took place in ministerial sentiment, due not so much to 
anxiety for the situation of royalty in France as to the astounding and 
rapid successes of French arms. From a nation about to be crushed 
by a superior military force, France became at a bound a great revolu¬ 
tionary power, pushing its doctrines and its armies beyond its own 
frontiers. French victories in Italy, on the Rhine, and in Belgium 
forced England to recognize that she must gird herself for war in de¬ 
fense of Holland. This was the determination reached by the English 
"ministry early in November, 1792.* A little later it is evident from 
Grenville’s instructions to Auckland and others that in Cabinet circles 
at least there was a definite purpose to restrain, and if possible to 
overthrow, the revolutionary principles enunciated by the French 
government,f though the final and public defense for the inauguration 
of war was the opening of the Scheldt and the defense of Holland.! 
So far, then, as the adoption of a war policy is concerned, there is no 
question of comparative influence between Pitt and Grenville. It is 
true that after September, 1792, the King was eager for a rupture with 
France, and it is probable that Grenville more readily came to this view 
than did Pitt, but both were convinced of the necessity of war and were 
/acting in perfect harmony. During the first months of preparation and 
endeavor, no important question of policy arose. Grenville was bus}" 
in detailed diplomatic negotiations with England’s allies. Pitt labored 
with Dundas to perfect a scheme of military operations. But when 
*This is shown by a letter from Buckingham to Grenville, Nov. 18, 1792. “I 
, am very glad that you have taken your line as to Holland. • * * ' I think it 
probable that you will be forced, in case of the conquest of the Netherlands, to in¬ 
terfere; and you cannot do it more wisely than by choosing for the ground, of the 
quarrel one so very essential to us, and upon which the minds of the people of 
j England have been so lately made up.” Dropmore, II, 336. 
t January 15, 1793, Grenville wrote to Auckland in regard to the proposed pub¬ 
lication of a letter from Fagel outlining the Dutch ideas of the attitude of Holland 
to France: “ It is, I doubt not, adapted to the present temper of the Republic, but 
the expressions of still hoping to preserve peace by adhering to neutrality would 
be construed here to exclude all measures to be taken on the general view of affairs, 
and for the object of restraining the progress of French arms and French princi¬ 
ples, even though we should not be the immediate objects of attack.” Ibid .. 366, 
Almost the same words are used in the Cabinet minute of Jan. 25, 1793, containing 
St. Helens’s instructions in proposing an alliance with Spain. The object here is 
stated to be “to establish a concert to prevent the progress of French arms and 
principles.” Ibid., 373. 
X The most exhaustive and critical analysis of the questions that led to war is 
Oscar Browning’s “ England and France in 1793 ” in the Fortnightly Review for 
February, 1883. The Dropmore MSS. bear out in the main all of Browning’s con¬ 
tentions, though the tenor of Grenville’s letters after November 15, 1792, is that 
the war is practically decided upon and that only a most unexpected giving way by 
France can avert it. If this be true, the numerous and involved negotiations sub¬ 
sequent to that date lose much of their importance and significance. They were 
continued rather with the idea of gaining time for preparation, and in order to 
conciliate Holland, than with any real hope of a peaceful adjustment. 
