RUPTURE OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. 
17 
England, not Russia, was isolated by the outcome of Grenville’s 
first efforts as the head of the Foreign Office. He alone directed the 
diplomacy of England during the negotiations,* but he alone was not 
responsible, for Pitt was his steadfast supporter in the Cabinet, agree¬ 
ing perfectly in the necessity for each step taken. Pitt indeed made 
light of the diminution of English influence, though he thought the 
result not very creditable.f Other Englishmen, and in particular 
English diplomats, were more bitter in their expressions. Keith, 
while refusing to criticize his government, deplored England’s isola¬ 
tion. X Malmesbury was vexed with English supineness, and pointed 
out to his political friends the opportunity for harassing the ministry.§ 
Ewart was embittered at the overthrow of the diplomatic structure he 
had been so largely instrumental in building, and could not find words 
harsh enough to characterize Grenville’s policy. || Other rulers than 
those directly concerned regarded England as withdrawing from the / 
theater of European politics.il These judgments were not unfounded, j 
, The first six months of Grenville’s diplomacy had, in truth, resulted / 
in failure, and the Triple Alliance ceased to be a factor in European v 
politics. It was fortunate for the reputation of Grenville and for the > 
continuance of his influence in English foreign policy that the wars of 
the French Revolution nullified every diplomatic prophecy and, creating 
j * Burges wrote to Ewart May 6, 1791 : “ Our foreign politics • • • • are solely 
fand exclusively those of Lord Grenville’s. * * * * By everything I can see, His 
jr Lordship is very rapidly gaining a preeminence which promises to place him much 
higher than any one at present suspects. * * * * Pitt gives way to him in a man¬ 
ner very extraordinary. * • * • One prime cause of the sudden turn we have 
{ experienced was owing to the influence of Lord Grenville.” Burges, 172. Up to 
.April, 1791, Pitt had kept up personal communication with English diplomats. 
5After that date, such interchange of letters almost entirely ceased. Everything 
now passed through Grenville. 
t Pitt to Rose, Aug. 10, 1791. Rose, I, no. 
f Keith felt the humiliation of his position at Vienna. February 4, 1792, he wrote 
Grenville : “A man in my situation, who is carefully debarred by the Austrian 
ministry from the smallest share in their secrets, has a very difficult task * * * \ ” 
Keith, II, 498. 
§ Malmesbury to Portland, Oct. 14, 1791. Malmesbury, II, 440. 
|| During the progress of the negotiations, Ewart wrote to Keith, June 18, 1791 : 
“* * • * What a dreadful change has taken place ! Our influence was all-pow¬ 
erful as long as it was maintained with the necessary vigor; and the moment we 
flinched all the Powers, as if by common consent, turned the tables upon us, and 
from having had the certainty of restoring peace in our power, there seems now to be 
the greatest wish of a general confusion. ' * * * It is impossible to suffer greater 
mortification than Ido at this moment. • • • • The Empress of Russia and Potem¬ 
kin are striving who can throw most ridicule on England and on our ministers at 
Petersburg. Their evident intention is to gain time, and to push their operations 
on the Black Sea. Oh ! how my blood boils, my dear sir ! ” Keith, II, 447. 
Gustavus III to Baron d’Armfelt, June 16, 1791 : “ Tout ce qu’on me mande 
d’Angleterre me prouve ses embarras et sert a me convaincre qu’elle ne met aucune 
suite dans sa politique exterieure.” Gustave III, V, 212. 
2 
