RUPTURE OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. 
15 
* ’ * * * § * it would still be desirable that the Turks should couclude on 
this basis, and look for their future security to the guarantees of other 
powers ' ' ‘ ’ ” * For the same reason Grenville refused to pre¬ 
pare a fleet for the Black Sea, a measure strongly urged by Prussia, f 
and a little later definitely destroyed Frederick William’s hopes of ever 
obtaining any benefit from the Triple Alliance by his answer to a request 
for aid in case war should ensue between Prussia and Austria. War 
did not indeed appear imminent, although the momentary friction 
between Prussia and Austria, due to the unexpected revolution in 
Poland, had cast a decided shadow on the previous friendly approaches. 
In answer to the Prussian inquiry, Grenville wrote to Ewart on July 6 : 
“ I will freely own to you that I entertain a strong persuasion that 
matters will not come to extremities with the Emperor. * It 
is a painful situation to be measuring one’s expressions between the 
fear, on one hand, of holding out expectations to Prussia which we 
could not perform and others would not, and on the other hand of con¬ 
veying an impression disadvantageous to our national good faith. The 
whole of our line is summed up in a few words. His Majesty’s present 
servants will certainly advise him at all risks to perform the engage¬ 
ments of his alliance, if the case exists ; but there is every reason in 
the situation of this country, and quite independent of any motive 
personal to ourselves, to wish that the case may not exist. We can 
answer for our conduct, but we can not answer for our success.” X 
It is evident that this communication was intended to convey an argu¬ 
ment similar to that previously used by Pitt in withdrawing from the 
proposed English-Prussian ultimatum to Russia,§ namely, that to 
give the support asked for w r ould result in driving Pitt’s ministry from 
office, and that with the return of the opposition to power the system 
of the allies would fall to the ground. The repetition of this argu¬ 
ment, now used in an entirely new connection, could not fail further 
to impress Frederick William II with the valuelessness of the Triple 
Alliance to Prussia. Grenville was right in thinking the danger of 
war remote, but the incident had not been used to England’s advan¬ 
tage, and it assisted the Austrian party at Berlin in inclining the King 
toward an Austrian alliance. 
The stubbornness of Catherine II and the diplomatic ability of 
Eeopold were more than a match for the poorly combined efforts of 
England and Prussia. Leopold dallied with the Prussian proposals and 
* Grenville to Ewart, May 24, 1791. Dropmore, II, 78. 
t Ewart to Grenville, May 17, 1791. Ibid ., 74 ; Lecky, V, 294. 
X Dropmore, II, 124. 
§ Lecky, V, 293, and see ante , p. 13, foot-note f. 
