14 the INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT’S FOREIGN POLICY. 
friendship. A new negotiator, Fawkener, was despatched to St. Peters¬ 
burg, and Ewart, who had been absent on leave in Eondon, was hurried 
back to Berlin. It now became the purpose of English diplomacy to 
secure favorable terms for the Ottoman government, if possible, but if 
Catherine II proved obdurate, to acquiesce in a Russian acquisition of 
territory. In this connection England’s relations with her ally, Prussia, 
were of the first moment. Ewart’s instructions were : first, to forward 
an English-Austrian-Prussian alliance with the view of forcing Russia 
to make peace with the Turks on the basis of the status quo existing 
before the war ; second, if this failed, to “ unite with the allies in re¬ 
quiring that the territory between the Bog and the Dniester * * * § * * * 
be reduced to the state of a desert ” ; third, if Austria refused to join, 
to consent to a cession of a part of the district of Ochakov to Russia, 
‘ * provided both banks of the Dniester be preserved to the Porte. ’ ’ * 
These instructions, then, still looked toward some limitation upon the 
demands of Russia. In this spirit they were cordially accepted f by 
the Prussian King, to whom Ewart had been instructed to appeal per¬ 
sonally. X In fact, Frederick William II had just been informed by 
Leopold II of the possibility of a friendly alliance with Austria and had 
consented to opening negotiations through Bischofswerder.§ Gren¬ 
ville, on being informed of this opening, sent Elgin to Italy, where the 
Emperor then was, offering in effect admission to the Triple Alliance. 
The purpose of both England and Prussia was to isolate Russia, and 
so force her to yield in the projected treaty with the Turks, but the 
result was exactly the reverse. The Polish coup d'Statoi May 3, 1791, 
/neutralized the friendly advances of Austria, while Elgin’s disclosures 
convinced Leopold II that under no circumstances would England 
undertake a war. Acting upon this belief, Austria drew nearer to her 
late ally, Russia, and increased her demands at Sistovo.|| Grenville 
was in truth determined not to risk a war, and although Parliament as 
yet knew nothing of the change of policy,he was instructing Ewart 
that ‘ ‘ in the case of a total rejection of all modifications of the status quo , 
* Memorandum by Ewart. Dropmore, II, 49. 
t Ewart to Pitt and Ewart to Auckland, April 30, 1791 ; Ewart to Grenville, May 
13, 1791. Ibid., 61, 68, 73. 
X Grenville to Auckland, April 19, 1791. Ibid., 51. 
§ For a general discussion of these negotiations see Sybel, I, 274-297. 
|| Sorel, II, 222 ; Sybel, I, 295 ; Keith, II, 436. Keith wrote to Grenville on June 
9, 1791, the day of the seeming disruption of the conference at Sistovo : “ Certain it 
is • * * • that from the moment Prince Kaunitz could form a tolerable guess 
respecting the objects of Lord Elgin’s last journey, he redoubled the haughtiness 
and inflexibility of his instructions to Baron Herbert.” 
*ff As late as May 9, Grenville was still asserting in the House of Lords the neces¬ 
sity of British preparation for a war with Russia. Pari. Hist., XXIX, 435. Pitt 
kept up the pretense much later in the House of Commons. 
