RUPTURE OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. 
*3 
English diplomats still breathed the language of firmness, and on 
March 27 an ultimatum to be addressed to Catherine II was sent to 
Whitworth at St. Petersburg.* * * § The arguments hitherto advanced 
against armed intervention had turned upon the dubious delay of Leo¬ 
pold II in making peace with the Turks at Sistovo,f the danger of war 
to English commerce, and the uselessness of Ochakov to Russia, even 
if acquired. These were now greatly strengthened by the evident dis¬ 
like of England for the war and the rapid lessening of Pitt’s majority 
in the Commons, J Grenville returned to the attack, and on April 16, 
three weeks after the sending of the ultimatum to Russia, an instruction 
was read to the Cabinet recalling it before delivery. Leeds, refusing 
to sign the paper, retired from the Cabinet,§ and Grenville at once took 
up the responsibilities of the office, though not formally assuming th< 
title of Secretary of State for the Foreign Department until June 8. 
The new regime in England was immediately manifested in the in¬ 
creased activity of English diplomats on the continent. Keith, who was 
watching English interests in the wearisome negotiations for an Austro- 
Turkish peace at Sistovo, received definite instructions. || Auckland 
concerted with the Dutch government measures to secure Austria’s 
* Koch, XIV, 500-503. 
f The quibbling of Leopold’s diplomats in the negotiations at Sistovo has not 
usually been cited as a cause of Pitt’s change of policy; yet Auckland wrote to 
Keith on March 24, 1791 : “ I have strong hopes that the incomprehensible conduct 
of Leopold, to which I allude, will tend to prevent the breaking out of new wars 
in Europe and in its effects to a general pacification sooner than was expected. I 
will take occasion to explain this by the first safe conveyance.” Keith, II, 394. 
J Various reasons have been asserted for Pitt’s sudden face-about. Stanhope 
(II, 115-118) ascribes it entirely to the lack of support in the country and in Par¬ 
liament, and quotes Pitt’s letter to Ewart, May 24, 1791 : “To speak plainly, the 
obvious effect of our persisting would have been to risk the existence of the present 
government, and with it the whole of our system both at home and abroad.” 
Sorel (II, 204-208) adopts the same view and adds the information that the rapid 
development of public opposition was due to the energy of the Russian envoy in 
London, Rostopochine, who busied himself in the distribution of articles, hand¬ 
bills, and monographs, and subsidized crowds to protest against the war. Bourgoing 
(I, 294-298) briefly mentions Grenville’s opposition, and states that this was based 
mainly on his anxiety over the menacing state of France and the fear of a spread 
of revolutionary principles, an idea clearly disproved by the Dropmore MSS. On 
the other hand, Malmesbury (II, 441) wrote on October 14, 1791, to Portland: “ It 
appears very clear to me, from some confidential communications wdiich w T ere 
made to me, that Lord Grenville was the cause of Mr. Pitt’s giving way, and that 
he acted not from the reason which was given, the nation’s being against it, but 
from its being his fixed opinion that we should not interfere at all in the affairs 
of the Continent.” The correct view seems to be that Pitt was weakened in his 
opinion by the attacks of Grenville, and that the ill-will of Parliament furnished 
the last and convincing argument. 
§ Leeds’s account was that on refusing to sign the new instructions, he suggested 
| that Grenville do so, thus indicating his knowledge of the person chiefly responsi- 
J ble for the change. Political Memoranda of the Duke of Leeds, 156-158. 
. || From December, 1790, to May, 1791, Keith had not had a line from Leeds. He 
was rejoiced, therefore, at the vigor with which Grenville took up the duties of his 
office. Keith, II, 418, 423. 
