THE SECRET PROPOSAL OF PEACE. 
69 
stated to the King that he had “distinctly explained to the person 
through whom the proposal conies, that enough must be stated to Par¬ 
liament, in order to procure the grant of the money, to satisfy them 
that it was really employed for secret .service on the Continent, with a 
view to the settlement of peace. ’ ’ * * * § On October 7 the affair had reached 
a point where Pitt, acting with Dundas, but with no other member of 
the Cabinet, despatched to Paris a virtual acceptance of the proposal. 
On the same day Pitt informed Grenville that “ the olfer (if it is real) 
seemed both to Dundas and me so tempting, and the time pressed so 
much to an hour (lest an answer should be given in the interval to our 
last note which w r ould preclude all chance) that we did not hesitate to 
desire Boyd to write to his correspondent immediately to the purport 
of the enclosed memorandum.” f Grenville immediately replied : “I 
cannot deny to you that the whole of that transaction is so disagree¬ 
able to my mind that I am very glad to have been saved the necessity 
of deciding upon it.” He then, while not specifically opposing the 
purchase of peace, further states his own feeling : 
“ I shudder at what we are doing, and believe in my conscience that, 
if this country could but be brought to think so, it would be ten thou¬ 
sand times safer (and cheaper too, which they seem to consider above 
all other things) to face the storm, than to shrink from it. And above 
all I dread the loss of consideration which must, I fear, infallibly result 
from any mode of purchasing our safety, and such this is, and will be 
felt to be, let us say or do what we will.” X 
Plaving thus expressed his own convictions, Grenville brought for¬ 
ward in the same letter a criticism of the terms of the memorandum 
so hastily forwarded by Pitt through Boyd. He pointed out in par¬ 
ticular that the memorandum promised that Malmesbury would be sent 
back to lyille, “with no other security for his future treatment than 
results from the private understanding established,” and that, in case 
of the very possible failure to conclude peace, this could but result in 
humiliation and dishonor to England. He urged then, as all-essential 
to any public renewal of negotiations, some public official declaration 
from France to enable Malmesbury to return to Eille. The point was r - 
well taken, and Pitt at once recognized its importance, while time and 
reflection made him less inclined to hasty action.§ When, therefore, j 
on October 17, a reply to Pitt’s memorandum arrived at Eondon 
still secretly promising all that was desired, but still unaccompanied 
* Pitt to George III, Sept. 22 , 1797. Stanhope, III, Appendix, p. vii. 
t Dropmore, III, 377. 
f Oct. 8, 1797. Ibid. , 378. 
§ Pitt to Grenville, Oct. 13, 1797 . Ibid. , 380. 
