THE FRENCH MANOEUVRES OF 1891 . 
73 
strikes one, as being the very life of the French army; it will carry men 
through many hardships if backed up by a really sound discipline. 
On the following day the most important engagement of the 
manoeuvres took place. The enemy, under General Boisdeffre, having 
been driven from their position on the right bank of the Voire, had 
retreated about seven miles further north, and taken up a strong line 
of defence, formed by a series of hills, with several villages to act as 
main points in the line of defence ; of these, Corbeil on the right and 
Margerie on the left centre, formed the keys of the position. 
The plan adopted by the attackers was to carry out a strong turning 
movement against Corbeil, driving back the defenders from their right 
into the Sois valley. This portion of the attack was assigned to 
the Army of the West, under General Gallifet. The Eastern Army 
was directed to envelop the left of the position, which was rendered 
very secure by excellent artillery positions on the right of Chasseri- 
court, overlooking the railway station of that name on the line running 
south from Vitry towards the Seine. The main attack was directed 
against both flanks, the centre, as far as one could observe, being 
somewhat neglected. Every effort was directed so as to work round the 
flanks of the position and take it to a certain extent in rear, and in 
every engagement during the manoeuvres this appeared to be the great 
aim and object of the attack. The front covered extended over six or 
seven miles, so the number of men per yard must have been quite 
seven or eight; the depth of formation of the attack was most striking, 
there seemed to be no end to the lines which followed, one on the 
other, in rapid succession, the formations becoming denser and denser 
as the distance from the rear diminished. The ruling idea seemed to 
trust in the sheer weight of numbers breaking down all resistance on 
the part of the defenders; granted that one half of the first line is 
killed, let their places be filled up from the rear, but let the attack 
proceed at all costs. This plan sounds well, and it is one which might 
do while an army is completely playing a winning game and has 
success on its side to carry it forward, but let it become somewhat dis¬ 
heartened by heavy losses, and the difficulty and danger of carrying 
out such tactics would be very hard to get over. 
The system, too, of instructing the enemy to take every advantage 
of cover, would appear to be followed to an exaggerated extent, not 
only did the firing line conceal itself on every possible occasion, but 
directly it halted to fire its supports were led off to the right or left to 
obtain concealment from the nearest hedge, or whatever other form of 
cover might be at hand. The men were extremely clever in finding 
cover, and no confusion or delay occurred in getting them to move for¬ 
ward again; but the plan carried out by the French must be a very 
dangerous one, let men, trained and disciplined as they may be, suffer 
heavily in their advance, and they will soon lose that keenness for 
facing a shower of lead and leaving the cover they have once taken. 
The Artillery took a most leading part in this engagement. The 
Infantry of the advanced-guard first came into contact with the enemy 
on a line of hills, which was held in advance of the main position by a 
battalion of Chasseurs. The latter were quickly driven in, but the 
