86 
FIELD FORTIFICATION. 
plied by cool and unshaken men, concentrated a murderous fire upon 
the advancing line. To their glory, be it told, though scores were 
swept away, falling in their tracks, like corn before the sickle, the ever 
thinning ranks dashed on. 
But before that threatening onset the Confederate veterans never 
quailed : volley on volley sped with deadly precision, and at so short a 
range every bullet found its mark. For a while the stormers struggled 
on desperate and defiant, but no men could long face that terrible fire, 
scathing and irresistible as the lightning, and at length the broken 
files gave ground. Slowly and sullenly they fell back; fell back to 
fight no more that day, for beneath the smoke cloud that rolled about 
Marye's Hill, the Irish Brigade had ceased to exist. Of 1200 officers 
and men, 937 had fallen. Forty yards from the wall where the charge 
was stayed the dead and dying lay piled in heaps, and one body, sup¬ 
posed to be that of an officer, was found within 15 yards of the parapet.” 
— {The. Campaign of Fredericksburg , by a Line Officer). 
Afghan War, 1879-80. 
Camp at Fort Batty e, October 26th, 1879. —Garrison—100, 4th Madras 
Native Infantry; 40 sabres, 4th Bengal Cavalry, and a few British 
signallers. 
On night of attack garrison was increased by 150 men of the 31st 
Bengal Native Infantry, who had halted there en route. 
At 11.30 p.m. the enemy appeared suddenly in great numbers on a 
plateau about 150 yards distant, and making a rush, gained the cover 
of the fort wall, when a hand to hand contest ensued. In a few minutes, 
however, the whole parapet was manned, and the British Infantry fire 
became so hot that the enemy retreated, carrying away all his dead 
and wounded, except six. British loss—1 officer and 7 men killed, 19 
men wounded. 19 of the garrison were wounded by sword cuts.— 
{Intelligence Department Account). 
In the former instance, it would at first sight appear to be clearly 
established that there is no need for “ obstacles” under such conditions, 
for nothing could exceed the resolution with which the attack was 
made, and yet it failed, even though the troops were able to advance 
to within 100 yards of the defending liue in close formation, and the 
fire of the defenders is not comparable to that from modern magazine 
rifles. But it should be noted that the attack was made on unshaken 
troops, equal in numbers, whose artillery had not been silenced, and 
that there was no quick succession of wave on wave of attacking troops, 
such as is contemplated in modern attack formations, but the mere 
thrusting forward of an isolated brigade to win or lose by itself. If 
under such conditions they were able to struggle forward so far, “ that 
40 yards from the wall the dead and dying lay piled in heaps,” it would 
hardly seem safe to abandon as useless the aid afforded to a defender 
by the use of obstacles, especially if it is found that night attacks 
become a regular feature of battles. 
The other instauce marks most clearly the need for the use of 
obstacles in such positions, if they can possibly be made. Instead of 
fighting under such conditions, that their superior arms would have 
