88 
FIELD FORTIFICATION. 
too trivial that helps to effect this. Thus, in constructing wire 
entanglements, frqshly cut tops of the pickets should be soiled with 
earth to prevent their showing white. 
The obstacles most easily formed under normal conditions are shallow 
military pits (at least 15 feet wide), as no materials are necessary ; but 
unfortunately, they take a good deal of labour. They may be improved 
by stakes, and still more by a simple wire entanglement. Abattis, 
whether of trees or of boughs in several rows, form a good obstacle; 
and it may here be noted that all the experience we have goes to show 
that abattis cannot be injured by artillery fire, even by heavy artillery 
fire. (On the occasion of our first attack on the Redan, the abattis 
were found practically uninjured, even after the heavy bombardment 
that had gone on). Inundations and other more elaborate forms of 
obstacle may be used when time and means allow. 
The question of clearing the ground must always be considered in 
connection with the use of obstacles. It used to be laid down as a 
rule that all hedges, fences, walls, etc., parallel to the line of defence 
should be cleared, while those perpendicular to the line of defence 
should be left as being calculated to break up the attack, impede 
effective command, and prevent complete co-operation against counter¬ 
attacks. As regards the hedges, etc., perpendicular to the line of 
defence, there was good reason for the rule as long as movements in 
attack could be made “ in formation,” and while the range of weapons 
was comparatively limited; but the greatly increased range of modern 
weapons enables flanking fire to be brought to bear from great dis¬ 
tances, and as attacks are now made in looser order, it is no longer 
advisable to have lines perpendicular to the line of defence which might 
shelter from flank fire, the advantage of breaking up the lateral con¬ 
tinuity of the attack beiug no longer of such great importance. All 
cover parallel to the line of defence must of course be cleared, but it is 
a matter for consideration whether such obstacles as hedges, which do 
not protect from fire, but which form a very serious hindrance to the 
advance of the attack, should be cleared. I have already strongly 
urged the advantage of a screen from sight, where absolute protection 
from fire cannot be obtained, and I have pointed out the moral sup¬ 
port it gives. So far as the hedge affords this to the attack, it is a 
disadvantage to the defence ; but where a hedge is not so thick as to 
screen from sight, a condition often fulfilled when there are no leaves 
on it, then I would ask you to consider how you would yourselves 
propose to get a fairly thick line of attack over a moderately stiff 
hedge. The probability is, that recourse would have to be made to 
gaps and gateways, which means that men would be got forward with 
difficulty, and the defence could concentrate their fire : supports and 
reserves would, if they are to be kept in any sort of formation, afford 
a good mark to the defenders when passing through gaps and gates; 
in any case, time would be lost, and time is generally an advantage to 
the defender. 
Clearing the field of fire generally progresses with the preparation 
of obstacles, and even in face of the general condition “that the 
obstacle should be under fire,” it is sometimes desirable to fill in 
