NAVAL ATTACK OF FORTIFICATIONS. 
95 
have a first-class cruiser which is evidently much less fit to cope with 
fortification than the “ Rodney.” 
But you will say to me, Have matters changed so much ? People 
are building coast defences : what are they all for ? Will they never 
be attacked ? Well, I think there are some cases in which we may 
attack coast defences, and I will give you some conditions which I think 
may make it necessary. 
First of all, it may be necessary to engage batteries when some 
strait or narrow passage, through which it is most desirable that your 
fleet should pass, is in the hands of the enemy, and is blocked by shore 
defences. There was a notable instance of that in the American war. 
It was most necessary for the Northern fleet to obtain possession of the 
Mississippi, because the Southern ships had command of the river, 
which is, you see, in some respects similar to having command of the 
sea; so that it was necessary to introduce Northern ships into that 
river, with the view of wresting the command from the Southerners. 
The entrance to the river was barred by the forts at New Orleans, and 
it was necessary for the Northern fleet to attack the forts to force the 
passage, which they did successfully. They were then able to get 
at, and overpower the Southern ships. 
Again, it may be that the defences shelter with their guns the enemy's 
ships—either men-of-war or merchant ships—which it is considered 
necessary to destroy; or, that although but few ships are sheltered, 
the establishments protected by the works are capable of building 
or equipping* ships, and thus are likely to exert an influence on the 
command of the sea. In these cases it may be necessary to engage 
batteries. A notable instance of this was Nelson's attack on Copen¬ 
hagen. We did not want the Danish fleet arrayed against us, and if 
was considered worth while to go in and smash the Danish fleet before 
it could put to sea and do us auy harm, notwithstanding the forts by 
which their ships were protected. But the forts at Copenhagen were 
not very strong, and wo did not wait till they became stronger, but went 
in at once. Another instance occurred in the war of 1812, in the 
American lakes. There was some very pretty fighting there on a small 
scale for the command of the lake. Each side had a dockyard, and 
built ships as fast as ever they could. The dockyard that built ships 
fastest put the most ships at sea, and that side, speaking generally, 
obtained the command of the lake. When they had fairly swept the 
lake, the next thing they did was to destroy their enemy's dockyard, 
so that no more ships might issue from it, and then they held command 
over the lake. But it did not last long : the dockyard was always re¬ 
built after beiug destroyed; more ships were built, and then came the 
fight at sea over again. 
Thirdly (but this only in a small degree) it may be necessary to 
engage batteries when shore defences command waters which it is 
wished to occupy, either temporarily while a force is being landed, or 
permanently in order to secure the port for your own use. Perhaps 
an instance of that which I may quote was Lissa; but the island of 
Lissa was not attacked, I think, for any rational reason, but because 
the good people of Italy thought that their fleet ought to do something, 
