NAVAL ATTACK OP FORTIFICATIONS. 
97 
of it, and the only thing left for them was to withdraw. Had they 
gone for the obstruction, it is quite possible that they might have got 
past it and succeeded, and although the forts were important, in that 
they beat the gun-boats, still the obstruction was more important, 
because it kept the gun-boats in front of the forts. So that our first 
object must be to get the channel clear, and if the channel is in constant 
use, as the Dardanelles would be, as the channel will be if it is worth 
calling a channel (because, supposing that a channel leads to nowhere 
and nobody comes from it, it is scarcely worth fighing for), I think it 
is possible by means of a surprise to find the channel to a great extent 
unobstructed. I do not know very much about the latest inventions 
in the way of mines, but I do not think that it is possible to keep such 
things as contact or mechanical mines about any channel which has to 
be used constantly. 
Then there is a question of observation mines. It is possible that 
they may be laid and kept there; but then they get out of order, and 
so it appears to me that the great thing to arrange for is a surprise. 
But we must not have a surprise on both sides. It was an utter 
surprise to Farragut, I suppose, when he went into Mobile and his 
leading ship was blown up by a torpedo; but that is not the sur¬ 
prise I mean. We must first send a few boats to see what the channel 
is like and how it is obstructed, and we shall find it most necessary to 
know all about the place, and that we can scarcely find out in wartime; 
we must do it in time of peace. We shall have to study carefully all 
the channels which it is possible we may have to attack, and in war 
time we shall have to catch the pilots who know the channel. We 
shall also in peace time have to study what has been done with a 
view of blocking that channel, all of which will give us useful infor¬ 
mation as to the sort of resistance which we are likely to encounter. 
Our reconnoitring force, consisting perhaps of a couple of cruisers and 
half-a-dozen gun-boats, mainly fast boats, with perhaps torpedo boats, 
will run in, and if they come out and report that the channel is 
sufficiently clear to go on, then we might go straight through. But 
supposing we find, as I fear we shall, serious obstructions in the channel 
and the people on shore more or less awake, then we shall have to 
attack the obstructions. That means bringing up a number of small 
craft, and those small craft are very troublesome, because they will 
not live at sea. You may, therefore, have a subsidiary piece of 
fighting in seizing a base where all those small craft could be collected, 
and when you have got your small craft together, then comes the 
fight. Now, in the case of England, we arrange our coast defences in 
such a way that the small craft which I think would do this work best 
do not all belong* to the Navy, but some at least belong to the Army. 
I mean the small craft which must more or less act as a defence for 
our own harbours, and which lay submarine mines, &c. But if the 
attack was made upon us, I have no doubt that a Continental Admiral 
would requisition those small craft who are themselves in the habit of 
laying down mines and getting about at night in narrow harbours, and 
who know how to navigate intricate waters. When you have collected 
this flotilla as quickly as possible, then they would have to go in and 
