EXPERIENCES AT OKEHAMPTON IN 1891 . 
115 
battery station lias very great advantages during the winter months, as the Major 
has a far better chance of getting at his men than he can have at the larger 
stations. (Hear, hear.) 
Major Dudley Buckle hoped that Officers of all ranks in every battery might 
be given more opportunities of practising the command of a battery in action. 
Captain Apsley Smith, Brigade Major Aldershot, said the lecturer’s state¬ 
ment as to the losses of infantry in a frontal attack on artillery requires, I think, to 
be sifted. Surely such a deduction from the hits on defenceless and stationary 
dummies is of little practical value. The Germans, speaking from experience, 
tell us that 25 per cent, of loss will stop the best troops; is infantry, then, never 
to make a frontal attack on guns ? As a matter of fact, the percentage of loss from 
artillery fire has always been small. The lecturer advocates silent drill. I forsee 
a “ boom ” in silent drill. The paramount importance of strict discipline and of 
quiet within the battery is obvious, but ought we to lose sight of the value of the 
voice? Should not a commander be sufficiently near his men to control them 
by his orders and influence them by his bearing ? Is not a system of signs and 
signals liable to break down in the heat of action? There are no less than 27 
signals in the drill-book and in the latest instructions for practice. Before we 
pin our faith to so many refinements, let us be sure that they can be worked in 
battle. The lecturer attaches great value to ‘‘preparatory” positions, although 
I am glad to hear that he limits the probability of such positions being possible to 
the 1st artillery position. Given, that the advance into action is unseen, and 
that surprise is possible, I, for one, agree with him ; but such conditions are surely 
exceptional, and can it be right to teach batteries always to expect them, and 
therefore to be unable to do without a “ preparatory ” position ? On ordinary 
ground, batteries will have to advance in view of an enemy, and often under his 
fire ; why then train them always to halt under perhaps imaginary cover, and then 
by gradually disclosing their exact position, to give an enemy every chance of 
crushing them ? The difficulty of pointing out targets, and the necessity of so 
many instructions to bat-tery commanders, to subalterns and to Nos. 1 would, I 
feel sure, be much less when the targets can move and shoot; and we should try 
to assimilate peace training to service conditions. I venture to think that 
batteries ' should prepare for action on leaving the line of march, and that the 
commanding officer, after galloping forward to select his general position, should 
return, give his orders, and lead his guns in line directly into action. After the 
first position, when the difficulties are greater, and the importance of train¬ 
ing is enhanced, this is what must be done; I submit, therefore, that this is 
what batteries should, as a rule, be taught to do, leaving the step-by-step occu¬ 
pation of a position from a “ preparatory ” position just in rear to be practised 
only in special cases. 
Lieut.-Colonel G. H. Marshall, B.H.A. —I would ask Captain White 
about his views on the subject of “ Distribution of Fire.” Does he propose to 
discard concentration of fire ? I believe the concentrated fire of massed artillery is 
enormously effective. For instance, at Worth the Germans had a mass of 84 
guns : they concentrated the fire of these on each French battery, and silenced 
each in turn. No doubt distribution of fire is necessary in certain cases, but I 
cannot think we are justified in discarding concentration. With regard to trying 
to get the first time fuze right instead of trying to get a graze , I submit that in 
view of the great difficulty of judging the burst of shrapnel, the latter method is 
best as giving a certainty of verifying. I quite agree with Colonel Spragge that 
it is unwise to collect in a close group the officers -and layers of a battery in 
order to point out the target. The danger is much increased in a brigade 
division, where the commanding officer would have a group of three battery 
commanders, nine section commanders and 18 layers, a total of 30. The figures 
given by Captain White showing the improvement in the burning of the fuze 
