EXPERIENCES AT OKEHAMPTON IN 1891 . 
117 
by him 6 or 7 years ago to be absolutely useless against even the smallest class of 
field work, was valueless against personnel, and yet the regiment was hampered 
with this expensive and inefficient projectile purely for ranging purposes, which 
seemed ridiculous. (Hear, hear.) Ring shells which were more or less efficient 
on graze against personnel , answered the purpose as ranging projectiles, and he 
believed were far cheaper than our steel common shell; they were universal abroad. 
All these difficulties with fuzes, projectiles and brakes would disappear so soon as 
we had the sense to have a gun with lower muzzle velocity. (Hear, hear, great 
applause.) He congratulated the regiment on the possession of instructional 
batteries, and hoped it was the beginning of a better system, as in Austria where 
he understand no experimental material was sealed still less introduced into the 
service without the recommendation and approval of practical gunners. He was 
no believer in the work of committees nor of draughtsmen until their labours had 
been purified by passing through the ordeal of the criticism of practical, though 
possibly less scientific artillerymen. 
Captain W. L. White —The principal points that require answers are on the 
distribution of fire and the occupation of preparatory positions. Colonel Spragge 
has stated that the distribution of fire is a weak point, and arises from the diffi¬ 
culty of making Majors, and through them the gunlayers, understand what is 
required. Is not this the best possible argument in favour of a careful pointing 
out of the target before the batteries are committed to action ? If the target is 
not carefully apportioned among them, Majors generally select the most con¬ 
spicuous object to range upon (we had an example of it this year of several 
batteries ranging on the same conspicuous spot) irrespective of the tactical 
sequence of the fight. It is the same in every service ; have we not the historical 
example of the church tower at Chulm to point the argument? With reference 
to what Colonel Marshall said about the huge group, it is not intended that all 
those persons should be collected together. The Lieut.-Colonel would first 
inform his Battery Commanders and they afterwards would communicate to their 
gunlayers. 
Colonel Marshall —Then that would take more than 3 minutes and 41 
seconds. 
Captain White —Yes, perhaps double that, or even 10 or 15 minutes: but 
what is that as compared with the importance of entering upon a life and deatli 
contest, that will probably last some hours, with everyone fully aware of the task 
before him. Are not the difficulties of pointing out now much increased by the 
use of smokeless powder which gives no indication of the position of the target ? 
Colonel Marshall mentions concentration of fire. In advocating the distribution 
of fire I do not in the least wish to discard concentration, but it must be concen¬ 
tration against a tactical point and not against a so-to-speak mathematical point, 
such as a single gun. The tremendous effect of modern shrapnel does not 
require the concentration of fire against single points to the neglect of others, 
indeed it would be dangerous to do so because the remaining guns would then 
practice almost under peace conditions and with almost peace precision. But the 
concentration of superior force and fire against a tactical point is highly desirable. 
The concentration of fire for a short time at Woerth was unpremeditated. The 
84 guns of the Vth Corps silenced the French guns opposed to them in the 
ordinary way by a fire distributed over their whole front, with the exception of 
one battery on the French left, which was so posted that it was difficult to get at, 
this battery then, being at one time the only one left, in action, did, I believe, for 
a short time attract a concentrated fire. With reference to Captain Smith’s 
opening remark, the loss I mentioned was 50°/ o of the firing line only, which is 
less than 25 °/ Q of the 1st line. Will he not too allow that the use of shrapnel 
shell is likely to produce more losses than when common shell was the only 
17 
