238 
THE OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA. 
splendid horsemen, who rivalled in daring and varied efficiency the 
dragoons of Gustavus and the cossacks of Platoff. But the Federals had 
all the advantages of a re-entering frontier, which gives such choice of 
plans to an able general, and such chances of escape to one who is 
unfortunate. They had, moreover, the command of the sea ; they 
could therefore have used their superior numbers to close the avenues 
leading on Washington, and into Maryland, to any forces that the Con¬ 
federates could dispose of against either, and, descending into the 
Chesepeake Reach from their depots on the Potomac, could have moved up 
the rivers York and James. After establishing new bases on these rivers, 
they would have turned all the enemy’s positions from the Bull Run 
to Gordonsville, and have planted themselves within a few strides of 
Richmond. Better still, they could move from City Point on Petersburg, 
and, cutting all the lines to the more Southern States, have isolated 
Richmond, and compelled its evacuation at once, or its surrender after 
a short siege. 
The advantages of flank as against front attacks were obvious to all 
the soldiers of the North as well as of the South. The officers educated 
at the famous West Point School added to their strong native common 
sense no small knowledge of the practice of Napoleon and the theories 
of Jomini. It would be well if history were as carefully studied at our 
own schools. 
The true method of conquering the Seceding states was foreseen and 
described by men of skill and experience like Generals Scott and 
Sherman from the very first, and General McClellan was actually 
within twenty miles of Petersburg in July, 1862. But when, or in 
what state, did the arrogant and ignorant leaders ofthe masses listen to 
any voice except the clamour of faction ? The teachings of military 
wisdom were spurned by the chiefs of a triumphant caucus till the stern 
lessons of a terrible necessity, resulting from years of constant and 
awful suffering, compelled the politicians at last to retire from the 
direction of the army, and, leaving war to the soldiers of General Grant, 
turn again to their natural vocation of deceiving the multitude. In 
this lecture we cannot follow the political intrigues that were so fatal to 
the Northern cause. They are recorded in the pages of every Federal 
authority—from Webb to Sherman—and our people ought to study 
them with a practical object. The South was better directed:—the 
President, Mr. Jefferson Davis, had been a good soldier in his time. 
Moreover, it would not have been so easy to impose delusions upon the 
planters of the Southern States as upon the uncultivated crowds of 
voters of the Northern cities ; again from almost the very beginning 
harmony prevailed as a rule between the commanders in the field in 
Virginia and the political leaders in its capital. 
The eagerness of the more incompetent advisers of Mr. Lincoln was 
inflamed by the unwonted spectacle of military power, which was 
suddenly arrayed in the neighbourhood of Washington after the challenge 
of the South at Fort Sumter. Fully 40,000 men rallied to the standard 
of the Union about the Capital, and nearly half as many more gathered 
round old General Patterson about Philadelphia, and soon occupied 
Harper’s Ferry, from which the confederate leader in the Valley, Joseph 
Johnston, very wisely retired, as he had only a feeble force, towards 
Winchester. Moreover, a considerable body of troops collected round 
General McClellan about Wheeling in West Virginia, and not only 
defeated the confederates under Garnett at Rich Mount and Carricks’ 
