THE OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA. 
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Ford (July 11th and 13th), but won over the country between the 
Alleghanies and the Ohio to the union, and threatened to penetrate into 
the Valley itself, till circumstances, over which McClellan had no control, 
rendered it impossible for him to operate any longer in this portion of 
the theatre. Not only did these movements against the seceders thus 
begin in the North, but in the York Town Peninsula, that is the space 
between the York and James Rivers, the Federals displayed some activity, 
however, their commander, Butler, was soon stopped at Big Bethel. 
The Campaign of 1861, is practically narrowed to the operations of 
Patterson (F.) versus J. Johnston (C.) in the Valley, and McDowell (F.) 
versus Beauregard (C.) along the Bull Run. Nothing could well be 
simpler than the situation. The Confederates held Centreville and the 
position along the Bull Run with some 20,000 men, who were decidedly 
of much better quality, individually, than their enemies. McDowell 
was at Arlington, and had some 30,000, with 10,000 in reserve. He 
could beat Beauregard alone ; he could not beat Beauregard if Johnston 
joined him. Manifestly therefore it was Patterson’s duty either boldly 
to attack Johnston, who never had more than 12,000 as against his 
20,000 men, and drive him well up the Valley away from Beauregard, 
or to move by his own left and keep Johnston away from the issues of 
the Blue Ridge leading on Manassas. He was distinctly ordered to 
adopt either alternative. He was timid and adopted neither. McDowell 
advanced on Centreville ; the Confederates retired behind the Bull Run. 
McDowell followed, and, not liking to force the river in front about 
Blackburn’s Ford, manoeuvred, July 18th-20th, to secure a passage on 
Beauregard’s left flank by Stone Bridge and Sudley’s Ford. He 
succeeded, but meanwhile Johnston easily eluded Patterson, and on the 
19th marched 9,000 men to Ashby’s Gap, while Patterson was at Charles¬ 
ton, and thence to the railway, and they arrived at Manassas in 
detachments so considerable on the 19th and 20th, as to enable 
Beauregard to defeat the enemy on the 21st. The Federals crossed the Bull 
Run at Sudley’s Ford, while Beauregard’s troops extended from Stone 
Bridge to the right of Blackburn’s Ford. These, however, soon changed 
front and, being ably supported by Johnston’s men, stopped the Federals 
throughout the forenoon and afternoon till the last of Johnson’s troops 
having arrived at Manassas, Kirby Smith’s brigade marched up from 
Manassas and entered into the battle from the woods west of Sudley, 
and other troops, who had been guarding the lower fords, came up 
also on the Federal right rear. The troops of McDowell now went 
to pieces and could not be rallied even at Centreville, and had to be led 
back into their camps by the Potomac. 
Beauregard and Johnston could not follow up their victory, and 
contented themselves with occupying Centreville and constructing a 
series of works along the Bull Run, and sending Jackson to re-occupy 
the Valley, no very difficult duty. 
Now the Federals recognized the serious nature of their task, and set 
up about calling large forces together from all quarters, either to the 
Mississippi and its tributaries, or to the Potomac. They were able to 
boast, at the end of the year 1861, of having more than 600,000 men 
under arms, and they had the good sense to recognize the fact that men 
with muskets are not soldiers, and they employed General McClellan, 
who had won some victories in West Virginia, to organize the “ Army 
of the Potomac .” He did well, very well indeed, better than D’Aurelle 
de Paladines in 1870, but no genius can improvise a good staff, good 
