242 
THE OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA. 
With 13,000 men he had, according to General Imboden, defeated an 
aggregate of 64,000 in thirty-five days, marching 245 miles and winning 
four desperate battles. These were certainly the most rapid and 
brilliant operations of war since Napolean had cut to pieces Blucher’s 
army on the Marne in 1814. 
In their strategical consequences they were far reaching ; they not 
only delivered the Valley—the great magazine of the Southern armies of 
Virginia—from all hostile troops, they brought about the ruin of 
McClellan’s plans by paralysing McDowell’s force. There is no small 
reason for the statement of the Federal commander-in-chief:—“ It is my 
opinion that had the command of General McDowell joined the army 
of the Potomac in the month of May, by way of Hanover Court House, 
from Fredericksburg, we would have had Richmond within a week 
after the junction.” 
With admirable secrecy and with no end of ruses , Jackson evacuated 
the Valley and moved to Ashland to take part in a scheme which Lee 
proposed against McClellan’s right under Porter, north of the 
Chickahominy. He hoped by turning the enemy’s flank to prevent his 
moving by positions under cover of his heavy guns, to within shelling 
distance of Richmond. 
On June 26th, the army of Lee, leaving Magruder to protect 
Richmond, moved, by Meadows Bridge, across the Chickahominy ; after 
a fight at Mechanicsville, the Federals retired from the strong position 
of Beaver Dam Creek to Gaines’ Mill. Jackson arrived in time to take 
part in the battle next day, June 27th, and, at the same time, Magruder 
advanced, in a succession of feints, against the union line south of the 
Chickahominy. The result of the battle of Gaines’ Mill was that Porter 
was defeated, and only saved by the fact that his retreat was covered 
by fresh troops from the south of the river. 
Lee supposed that McClellan would try to hold his base at White 
House, and retreat by way of the Peninsula, but the Federal general 
resolved to make a “ strategic movement to his rear” on the James 
River. He evacuated his magazines at White House, and when Lee 
saw through his intentions, he had had twenty-four hours’ start and his 
plans were well advanced towards execution. He sent 5,000 waggons, 
2,500 head of cattle, and his reserve artillery across the White Oak 
Swamps, and he guarded the roads through the swamps to protect the 
passage of his trains and troops from a flank attack during the march. His 
precautions were all needful, for he was persistently assailed by 
Magruder, Longstreet, Hill, and Jackson, at Allen’s Farm, Savage Slatim, 
Glendale, and Malvern. However, all these rear guard engagements, 
and especially the last, were well managed, and, by July 2nd, he was 
safe under shelter of his gun boats at Harrison’s Landing. 
Lee, whose army had been exhausted in seven days of constant 
fighting, did not venture to assault this position, and the Confederates 
were content with having delivered their capital, and prepared them¬ 
selves for some new development of the enormous resources of their 
enemy. 
This Federal change of base, from the York to the James, was one of 
the ablest movements ever made by way of retreat, and during it the 
army of the Potomac was only saved from disaster by the perfection of 
its organization and the personal affection entertained for General 
McClellan by the officers and men of his army. 
