THE OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA. 
243 
The authorities at Washington, having ruined their General’s plan, 
now cast about to supersede him. General Halleck became their 
military adviser, and they resolved on forming an army of Virginia on 
the Rappahannock, composed of the troops of McDowell, Banks, and 
Fremont who resigned and whose command was given to Sigel; this army 
was put under Pope, an officer who had gained some fame on the 
Mississippi, and whose views and methods were more in accordance with 
those of the cabinet than were McClellan’s. The latter leader was to be 
obliged to evacuate the Peninsula, and his corps were to go up the 
Potomac, and to serve as supports and reserves to General Pope’s forces, 
which were to move on Gordonsville and thence on Richmond. In 
other words, the army, which was safely on the James, almost within 
reach of Richmond, was to return to Acquia and Alexandria, and thence 
work its way across all kinds of obstacles to the James again. It is 
not strange that its commander protested, but as he had to obey he did 
his duty by getting his army securely to the several places of embarka¬ 
tion down the Peninsula. 
Meanwhile Pope had made himself laughable and execrable by 
fulminating ridiculous manifestoes on the art of war, and by harassing 
and maltreating the people of Virginia. He did not display much 
promptitude, notwithstanding all his bluster, and allowed General 
T. Jackson to anticipate him by occupying Gordonsville, a decisive 
strategic point on the way to Richmond, while Lee protected that capital 
against McClellan. In the beginning of August, at Cedar Mount, 
Jackson inflicted a sharp blow on Banks, but, as being much inferior in 
force, had to retire behind the Rapidan. When it became obvious to 
Lee that McClellan’s troops were really quitting their postition at 
Harrison’s Landing with the object of going north, he sent General 
Stuart with his cavalry to the aid of Jackson, and soon followed himself 
to the Rappahannock. 
It was now obvious, first, that Pope’s army was too strongly posted on 
this river to be defeated by a front attack, and second, that his numbers 
were being augmented by the troops from the Peninsula, and that, 
already superior in numbers to Lee, he would be almost irresistible 
when joined by all his reinforcements. The only course left to the 
Confederates was to dislodge him by a flank movement, and with this 
view to divide their own forces, if necessary :—a dangerous piece of 
strategy. 
Lee, therefore, watched Pope along the river, while Jackson, by a long 
circuit, was to fall upon his rear at Manassas. It will be observed that 
turning flanking operations were very popular with Lee and Jackson. 
They were influenced by the character of their troops and the nature of 
the country. The men of both armies were comparatively raw levies, 
highly susceptible to the influence of surprise, and the appearance of an 
enemy on their flanks or in their rear was calculated to throw them into 
disorder. The wooded character of the theatre of war, moreover, 
facilitated such movements. Jackson, with admirable secrecy, moved 
across the Rappahannock by an almost forgotten ford, pushed on by 
Salem to Thoroughfare Gap, reached Manassas on the night of August 
26th, took it, and next day destroyed the great* depot. Pope now hastened 
north to protect it, but was delayed by one of Jackson’s chiefs (Ewell), 
at Bristoe, and another force sent from Washington to save the magazines, 
was defeated. Jackson, having caused Pope to turn right round, and di¬ 
verted his army from the direction of Richmond to the Bull Run, had to 
