244 
THE OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA. 
look sharply after his own safety, for the enemy was more than three to 
one, and more reinforcements from the army of the Potomac were arriving 
on the scene. He retired to Sudley’s Ford by roads north and south of 
the Bull Run, and resolved, by occupying a strong position south of that 
river, and perpendicular to it, to delay Pope’s army and wait for Lee, 
who would soon come to his aid. We have not time to follow Pope’s 
marchings and countermarchings, or to inquire into the merits of the 
disputes between him and McDowell and Porter, his subordinates. It 
is very clear that he quite misunderstood the situation. 
His true policy was to obstruct Thoroughfare Gap, the only road by 
which Lee could reach Jackson quickly, and, having closed this issue, 
crush Jackson betimes. McDowell could and would have stopped the 
Gap, but was ordered to Manassas, where Pope hoped (to quote his 
words), to “ bag the whole crowd ” of the opposite side. So the Gap 
was left open. Jackson was attacked on the 28th and 29th, but resisted 
gallantly, and on the 30th Lee took Pope’s army in flank and drove it 
over the Bull Run. Jackson turned Centreville also September 1st, 
after a combat at Chantilly,but (September 2nd) Pope, though now joined 
by two fresh corps of McClellan’s army under Sumner and Franklin, 
fell back through Fairfax Court House on Washington. 
The chiefs of a democracy can, like other folk, be as base in adversity 
as arrogant in prosperity, and President Lincoln and his “ advisers ” now 
begged McClellan to resume his old position on any terms, reorganize 
the routed army and save the Federal capital. He consented, but gave a 
modern example of the conduct which Roman Chroniclers ascribed 
to the ancient heroes of their history, he refused to bargain for his 
services till he had secured the safety of his country. He took the 
command ; he saved the capital ; under him the army of the Potomac 
again moved ably and fought with daring, but he was soon to experience 
another truth taught by the same chroniclers, that to trust the wire 
pullers of the populace is to “ swim with fins of lead.” 
The fortifications of Washington and the River Potomac were serious 
obstacles, and accordingly Lee resolved to enter Maryland, and on 
September 3rd he advanced on Leesburg and crossed into Northern 
territory. He thus drew away the invaders from Virginia ; he hoped to 
get recruits in Maryland, many of the people being well disposed to the 
South, but in this he was disappointed. He further hoped to pass 
through the South Mountains, lead the enemy after him, still keeping his 
communications with the Shenandoah Valley open, by means of Jackson’s 
force, which was to take Harper’s Ferry. When he had led the enemy 
up far enough, he trusted thai he might defeat them in a decisive battle, 
take Washington or Baltimore, and end the war. He was, however, soon 
anticipated in the South Mountains by McClellan, with very superior 
forces, and obliged to fall back to the Antietam, where he took up a strong 
position, and waited till the arrival of Jackson from Harper’s Ferry, 
enabled him to repulse the Federal onslaught about Sharpsburg, 
September 17th. Lee crossed the Potomac near Shepherdstown, and in 
a few days was safely encamped along the Opequan in the Valley, with 
head quarters at Winchester. 
Stuart now made another “ raid ” on a remarkable scale. He rode 
right round the enemy’s whole army. With 1,800 troopers and four 
pieces of horse artillery, he crossed the Potomac above Williamsport, 
marched to Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, destroyed the machine 
shops and a vast amount of military stores, and moved to Frederick 
