FIELD ARTILLERY FIRE. 
321 
this wood was held by the French who were subjected to a tremendous 
cannonade by the Corps Artillery of the III Corps and others, dis¬ 
tributed along the whole front of the wood. This fire had the effect of 
driving the French some 100 yards back into the wood, but when the 
cannonade ceased and the German infantry attempted to advance from 
the neighbouring Bois de Genivaux to the Folie copse, the French re¬ 
sumed their positions along the lisiere and completely repulsed every 
attack directed against them. 
A few days later, at Sedan, on September 1st, 1870, the correct 
method of attacking infantry in a wood was illustrated aud is thus 
described by Prince Kraft in his IVth Letter on Artillery in speaking 
of the attack on the Bois de Garenne : . . . . masses of infantry 
crowded together in this wood ... I divided the long edge of the 
forest, which extended before us, into sections, and I assigned one 
section to each of my batteries. The first gun of each of these units 
was to fire at the very edge of the wood and each of the following 
guns was to fire in the same direction but was to give 100 paces more 
elevation than the gun on its right. In this way the edge of the forest 
and the forest itself, to a depth of 500 paces, would be covered with a 
hail of shells. The splinters would carry yet further." 
This same method of procedure is equally applicable to the attack 
of villages, for by it the garrison of the front edge of the buildings, 
which is held in reserve in rear of those buildings while the prepara¬ 
tion of the attack by the artillery .is going on, would be driven further 
and further back into the village and would give a chance to the at¬ 
tacking infantry to get close in before the front prepared for defence 
could be re-occupied. 
Concentration of fire. The necessity for the concentration of fire 
against a so-to-speak mathematical point, such as a single gun, has 
disappeared with the introduction of shrapnel shell and accurate wea¬ 
pons, but the necessity for the concentration of fire against a tactical 
point still remains, and, as bringing the greatest force to bear on a 
decisive portion of the enemy's line, is one of the highest exhibitions 
of the skill of the tactician. 
Such is the deadly effect of modern weapons that, unless we possess 
a superiority in numbers we cannot afford to concentrate our fire on 
single guns leaving others undisturbed, the practice of these latter 
would become too good. 
We shall thus have to deal with instances where a superior force of 
artillery is brought to bear against an inferior. When this is the case 
it is laid down that the superiority of force should be used against the 
enemy's flanks by outflanking and bringing an oblique fire to bear 
on one or both of them, his fire is thus silenced progressively from one 
or both flanks. To take an illustrative case of the distribution of fire 
of more than one battery against a small target, let us suppose that 
two batteries are told off to engage a single battery of the enemy, 
standing on the flank of a line of artillery. 
Ranging. One battery would find the range for both, and the other 
verify it; or, if the enemy's guns were sufficiently far apart, each bat¬ 
tery might have a ranging point in an opposing half battery. 
