355 
SOME NOTES 
ON 
APPLIED FIELD FORTIFICATION. 
BY 
LIEUT.-COLONEL E. CLAYTON, R.A. 
The writer, whilst a Professor at the Staff College, found certain 
difficulties continually arising in the application to actual ground of the 
theoretical principles of Field Fortification. The following pages are 
an attempt to diminish these difficulties by, as far as possible, antici¬ 
pating them, discussing them, and suggesting various solutions from 
which choice may be made as occasion requires. 
Selection of Position. 
It is not proposed to enter into a discussion on the strategic con- selection of 
ditions which may dictate the occupation of a defensive position, but Position - 
simply taking for granted that circumstances demand it, to indicate 
the reasons which would influence a commander in choosing the actual 
ground he should occupy. 
The reason which will outweigh all others will be that it will serve 
the object he has in view. After that come the conditions that it should 
have as clear a field of view and fire as possible, and that it should 
bear some sort of proportion to his force. But this proportion will 
vary within very wide limits. The Battle of the Lisaine, in January, 
1871, shows how a General may be obliged to defend a position quite 
out of ordinary proportion to his force. General von Werder, to pro¬ 
tect the siege of Belfort, had to guard a space of some 22 miles with 
only 37,000 infantry, or barely \\ men to a yard. 
But it may be desirable to have some sort of normal proportion as a 
guide. Until actual experience with the most recent developments of 
arms and explosives is obtained, some sort of guide may perhaps be 
found in a consideration of the strength of occupation of the German 
lines of investment round Metz in 1870, as given by Paulus in his work, 
“ Die Cernirung von Metz.” 1 From the data given by him we find 
that in the first days of the investment, before any works of fortifica¬ 
tion had been carried out, 14,800 paces out of the 54,900 embraced in 
the whole line were watched only by cavalry, and the remaining 40,100 
paces were occupied by 145,700 infantry, about 12,000 cavalry and 
622 guns, giving an average of 3*6 infantry per pace, with a proportion 
for every 1000 infantry of 82 cavalry and 4*25 guns. From the middle 
1 Paulus. Cernirung von Metz. Appendix p. 125, sqq. 
8. VOL. XIX. 
48 
