356 
NOTES ON APPLIED E1ELD FORTIFICATION. 
Protection 
of Flanks. 
Distribution 
of Troops. 
to the end of October, however, when the line had been strengthened 
by fortification, we find the average strength of infantry reduced to 2*5 
men per pace, with 90 cavalry and 4*7 guns per 1000 infantry, the pro¬ 
portion of infantry being very considerably reduced, while that of the 
two other arms is slightly increased as compared with the infantry. 
From these figures we may perhaps draw the deduction that in an 
average European country the front of an extensive position may be 
adequately defended by 3| infantry per pace, with the usual proportion 
of cavalry and guns if no works of fortification have been carried out, 
or by 2 J infantry per pace if the position has been artificially strength¬ 
ened. This would provide for the, generally speaking, passive defence 
of the front, including local counter-attacks and local reserves, but 
would not include such forces as might be considered necessary for 
decisive offensive action and for the protection of flanks not naturally 
strong. 
Protection of flanks.—A. General, recognising that an enemy will have 
strong inducements to operate on the flanks of his position, will first try 
to extend his line sufficiently to rest them on natural obstacles or to 
make it dangerous to try and outflank them. If he cannot do this 
without weakening his line more than he thinks safe, the flanks must 
be protected in some other way. Probably the best way to protect an 
exposed flank is by posting a body of troops in echelon in rear of it, so 
as in turn to take in flank an attack directed on the flank of the main 
line, or necessitate a dislocation of the enemy’s force if he attempts by 
a still wider movement to get round the refused force itself. If 
possible, however, the existence of this refused echelon should be con¬ 
cealed from the enemy’s knowledge during the early stages of the 
action.” 1 
Strong localities on the flank of the main line would also be of great 
value, for they ought- so to check the flank attack as to give the refused 
echelon and the reserves time and opportunity to act on the flank or 
even the rear of the attacking force with most decisive results. 
If, then, a refused echelon is the best way of protecting an otherwise 
exposed flank, a General, if he finds no practicable extension, will bring 
his flanks to positions of natural safety and will be influenced towards 
somewhat restricting the front occupied by his main line, so as to have 
more troops available for protecting the flanks he ultimately decides 
on. So that at first, in making his plan, the General will try if he can 
stretch his force to safe flanks, but if he finds he cannot do so, will 
draw in his front till he can spare from his main line fully sufficient 
force to meet the flank attacks from which he cannot escape. 
The General, having decided on the front to be occupied and the 
amount of his force he shall keep in rear of his flanks and in reserve, 
will then assign certain portions of the position to his different units. 
For instance, suppose he has five Army Corps and that one flank of 
the position is so strong naturally or strategically as to be practically 
safe from a serious turning movement, he might keep one corps in 
reserve, place another corps in echelon behind the exposed flank, and 
divide the front of the main position between the three other corps. 
1 See remarks on masking advanced position, p. 363. 
