NOTES ON APPLIED FIELD FORTIFICATION. 
359 
whole of the hollows and the flat upper surfaces of the spurs between 
them, and the extremities of the spurs can be held as detached ad¬ 
vanced positions to command the slopes at the end of the spurs, which 
would be otherwise unseen. With this arrangement the assailant 
would be under fire the whole time of his advance :—if he attempted 
to pass up the hollows he would be met by fire in front and on the 
flanks, and if he attacked the spurs, should he capture them, which he 
might do, as they would be the weakest points, he would find himself 
confronted by the intact line behind. Naturally it would not be 
necessary to hold the rear line in force at first. The fire from the spurs 
would keep off the assailants until an attack was developed in force 
and pushed vigorously home, and then the rear line could be occupied 
at those points where danger became visible of the enemy overpowering 
the resistance of the advanced detachments. 
If the line of high ground is fairly straight, but steep and broken, 
the choice will lie between placing the infantry line at the foot of the 
heights and the artillery on the summit, or placing both guns and 
infantry on the crest. The Germans on the Lisaine at Bethoncourt 
and Bussurel adopted the first course, using a low railway embankment 
at the foot of the heights as cover for the infantry line. They were 
probably right. Their rifles were shorter ranging than those of the 
French, and by placing their men at the foot of the slopes they got 
within effective rauge of the obstacle of the Lisaine and had a sufficient 
open field of fire over the flat meadows at the bottom of the valley. 
But there are disadvantages in such a position. It is very likely to be 
commanded by ground that can be occupied by the enemy’s artillery, 
reinforcements are much exposed in an advance down the slopes, and 
if retreat were necessary the retiring troops would probably suffer 
greatly in falling back up the heights. The moral effects of such dis¬ 
advantages would be likely to be serious in the case of troops not so 
convinced of their superiority to their enemies as were the Germans at 
the Lisaine, and therefore it would propably be generally best to place 
the infantry main line at the top of the heights, if the slopes could be 
fairly well seen or flanked and not much dead ground were the result. 
If necessary, skirmishing lines might be pushed forward to command 
an obstacle or see into dead ground, it being clearly understood that 
they were not to be reinforced, but that the decisive stand was to be 
made on the upper position. 
A very difficult case is presented by a high steep ridge with a convex steep convex 
outline in section, such as is presented in England very often by chalk ground# 
downs. The section generally shows first at the top a gentle slope 
gradually curving over to a steep pitch, and then gentler slopes again 
at the foot, as in fig. 3. 
Fig. 3. 
A 
