860 
NOTES ON APPLIED FIELD FORTIFICATION. 
Line retired 
on plateau. 
Several situations for the defensive line may be found in the case of 
ground of this character, all of them having their own peculiar qualities. 
First, a line may be chosen at A at the foot of the steepest slopes. 
Here very often a good open range is obtained over glacis-like ground, 
but otherwise the position has many disadvantages. It is likely to be 
commanded within range by ground that can be occupied by the enemy, 
the supports would have to be in trenches in the slope above the line 
and very difficult to protect, reserves would have to move down the 
steep slope in full view of the enemy and retreat would be very 
hazardous. 
The French at Spicheren did not occupy the lower edges of woods 
stretching down slopes of this nature, probably because they feared the 
moral effect on their men of the steep slopes behind them; but, never¬ 
theless, in the case of woods it may be sometimes necessary to come 
down the slope. Generally speaking, however, this low position would 
be undesirable. Secondly, a line may be taken at B at the edge of the 
steepest slope. From here all the ground in front is seen and com¬ 
manded, but the position is some way down the face of: the slope and 
may be exposed to the enemy's distant fire, and the covering of the men 
might be difficult, especially on chalk, where the surface soil is very 
shallow and the solid chalk is soon reached. It would, not, however, be 
desirable to give up the position B altogether and place the line at 0, for 
that it would be to give up all power of bringing fire upon the steep 
slopes and the low ground and allow the enemy to get over a great deal of 
dangerous space unmolested. A good arrangement would be to keep 
back the bulk of the troops behind C during the early stages of the 
action and during the preliminary cannonade, and only place a thin line 
of picked shots at B, who would harass the enemy's deployments, and 
possibly his guns, if within range. Then, as the attacking infantry ad¬ 
vanced, the line at B could be reinforced so as to increase the intensity 
of fire to the utmost, while reserves were brought up to 0 and kept just 
out of sight ready to make a counter-attack, if in spite of the fire the 
enemy should be able to get close to the line at B. A counter-attack 
delivered just as the enemy was on the point of rushing to the attack 
of that line, whilst still struggling with the difficulties of the ascent of 
the steep ground, would have every chance of success and, if successful, 
would preserve the line B intact and retain the command over the low 
ground. 
Lastly, there is the situation some distance back on the plateau at D, 
but within musketry range of the crest 0. This position requires 
serious and careful consideration. Certain writers, especially French, 
strongly advocate such a position, notably Commandant Paquie, as men¬ 
tioned by Captain Mayne, B.E., in his work on “Infantry Fire Tactics" 
(p. 207). 
The main arguments in its favour are these : firstly, whereas the 
position on the crest is exposed to, and can be rendered untenable by 
the direct fire of the assailant's artillery and infantry, in the case of 
the retired position the attack cannot be prepared by artillery fire from 
a distance, the guns of the attack must be brought up to the crest before 
they can prepare the attack, and it will be impossible to bring them 
into action there under the withering fire of the defender's infantry, and, 
