NOTES ON APPLIED FIELD FORTIFICATION. 
361 
therefore, the attack, unprepared by artillery, must necessarily fail. 
Secondly, it is argued that if the position is taken up on the crest, all 
the bullets fired at the line, which are a little too high and pass over it, 
will sweep the ground in rear with a hail of projectiles, causing such 
loss among the supports and reserves as will prevent them from 
reinforcing the first line and making counter-attacks. The position 
held by the Germans at Villiers and Cocuilly in the investment of Paris 
and the events of the battle of Champigny are given as an instance of 
the successful employment of a line retired back from the edge of a 
plateau. 
There is no doubt some force in these arguments, but there are 
very strong ones that may be urged on the other side. The main 
arguments against the retired position are these:—That as it is proposed 
only to occupy the crest by a weak line which is not to offer a strenuous 
resistance but to fall back when pressed, the enemy will be able to occupy 
the crest without using any very strong force and without calling up his 
reserves, and that, therefore, he will be able to get within effective 
musketry range of the defensive line without having suffered much and 
with all his reserves intact. When he has once dislodged the defenders 
from the crest, the latter lose all command over the ground in front of 
the crest, and the attacker’s reserves can be moved freely and securely 
in any direction, and can be massed anywhere unknown to the defenders. 
This is most serious for the safety of the defensive line. In the case 
of Champigny, the German positions were part of a continuous invest¬ 
ment line and therefore had no flanks that could be assailed, and the 
French were obliged to attack in front. But in the case of an ordinary 
position, it would often be most serious for it to be possible to mass 
large forces of the attack in positions whence they might be able to 
attack a flank at short distance unawares. Moreover, in many cases it 
would be possible to bring guns up under cover to the crest, and then 
push them forwards into action just over rising ground. In fig. 3 
they could be brought up safely to B, and then pushed forward till they 
could just look over C, and would then be in a most effective position 
to prepare the attack, and it is at least doubtful if the musketry of the 
defensive line would be able to prevent their coming into action. 
Again, if the enemy were allowed to establish and perhaps entrench 
themselves on the crest, a counter-attack against them would be very 
difficult, and counter-attack is one of the most potent weapons of the 
defence. If, on the other hand, the crest is held as main line, a counter¬ 
attack delivered from it on assailants toiling up the front slope with 
no points of support or shelter nearer than the bottom would have the 
greatest chance of success. 
But the strongest argument against the rearward position is derived 
from considerations of moral effect, the most important factor of all in 
deciding the fate of an action. Consider the effect on the nerves of the 
defenders of the main line of lying in inactivity in a position with no 
view beyond the crest close in front, of then seeing the skirmishers who 
have been occupying the crest come helter-skelter back at an early 
period of the action, and knowing then that the enemy has already got 
oyer all the wide space that can be seen from the crest and all the 
difficulties, whatever they may be, of the ascent of the heights and is 
