362 
NOTES ON APPLIED FIELD FORTIFICATION. 
now posted, in unknown force, within a comparatively short distance 
of their line. Then think of the hours perhaps during which they will 
be exposed to fire from the captured position, certainly of musketry, 
often probably of guns also, while in absolute ignorance of what may 
be passing just beyond the brow of the hill, certain that a terrible blow 
is being prepared somewhere, but utterly unaware of the points on 
which it will fall or of what nature it will be. Then consider whether 
the morale of the defenders does not run a serious risk of being 
prejudicially affected, and whether the chances have not greatly in¬ 
creased of a panic setting in, when at last the assailants* preparations 
are complete and a forward movement begins, demonstratively every¬ 
where, decisively at certain points, known to the attackers but entirely 
beyond the ken of the defenders. 
The reasons for preferring the position on the crest will probably 
gain in strength by the introduction of smokeless powder, for it will 
seem akin to madness to give up the extended view over the movements 
of the enemy, shrouded no longer by clouds of smoke, that may be 
obtained from the crest, for a position from which little can be seen, 
and the advantages of which are after all more theoretical than founded 
on experience. For, as has been already mentioned, deductions drawn 
from an investment line cannot be considered generally applicable, and 
experience has hitherto failed to substantiate the supposed danger to 
the supports and reserves of fire directed on and missing the front line 
on a crest. Moreover, when smokeless powder is introduced the 
assailants will find it much more difficult to distinguish the exact position 
of the defenders even on a crest, and to direct the supposed insupport¬ 
able fire upon them, so that another argument for the rearward line will 
be considerably weakened. 
Observation posts and balloons, too, must not be relied upon to 
neutralise the disadvantages of losing the view from the crest; for, 
besides that, conditions of weather or of ground might render the 
observations from balloons or distant observing stations most insuffi¬ 
cient, even if they provided the superior officers with the most perfect 
information, they could not counteract the bad influences on the men*s 
morale which have been alluded to above. 
On the other hand, the introduction of magazine rifles will no doubt 
render it more difficult for the assailant to attack the rearward position 
even if he has reached the edge of the plateau, and so far strengthens 
the argument for taking up that position. But still it must be a dis¬ 
advantage to be driven with guns and all from the commanding position 
on the crest at any early stage of the action, and if it is replied that the 
crest should be held sufficiently strongly to enable the guns to maintain 
their position as long as required, that course commits the line on the 
crest to a serious fight, and it would surely be better to fight it out 
there than deliberately to withdraw to the rear position with all the risks 
incident to such a retreat. 
Taking then everything into consideration, it would seem on the 
whole to be best as a general rule to make the crest the main fighting 
position, while the rearward position would make a very strong second 
line if it should happen that the first line was pierced at any point. 
