620 
ACHIEVEMENTS OE FIELD ARTILLERY. 
French guns over-matched the hostile artillery by their greater pre¬ 
cision and range, and they deserve the credit due to those who have 
done what has been required of them. But their superiority in materiel 
rendered anything heroic unnecessary. Therefore it is that we pass 
over this campaign, and look to another shortly to break out in the 
New World for our next illustration. 
The deductions which have hitherto been drawn from the American 
War have had reference rather to the employment of mounted infantry, 
the value of entrenchments, or the effect of sudden swoops of raiding 
cavalry, than to the deeds of artillery. The feats performed by the 
arm have indeed, in more than one quarter, been disparaged, and have, 
except in America, been almost always ignored. Unjustly so, how¬ 
ever, as we believe. It was not to be expected that without experience 
in handling large masses of the arm, with gunners but poorly trained, 
and officers in many cases new to their work, and, above all, on the 
Federal side at least, hampered by the vicious system of organisation 
forced upon them by the War Department, the leaders on either side 
could at once utilise the arm to the best advantage, or develop its 
capabilities to the fullest extent, but as the war went on its value was 
more appreciated, and instances can be brought forward to show that 
it was turned to account in a manner worthy of the great masters on 
this side of the Atlantic. 
The same cause which was largely responsible for the lack of com¬ 
bination in the handling of our Field Artillery in the Crimean campaign 
was also at the root of the failure of the arm, especially on the Federal 
side, during the earlier days of the war. The command of the artillery 
in the Crimea was not invested with all the independence and authority 
which was desirable, and the arm was regarded rather as an appendage 
to infantry units than as an arm capable of independent action, and 
most likely to achieve great results when so regarded. Without 
wandering into any side issue unnecessarily, it may be briefly stated 
that the canker which was at the root of our artillery system of forty 
years ago was the fact that the arm was then on a different footing 
to the rest of the army, and was controlled by the dual government 
brought about by the existence of the Board of Ordnance. 
In America the organisation of the artillery was at the commence¬ 
ment of the war equally unsatisfactory, batteries were at first- almost 
regarded as battalion guns, there were not enough senior officers, and 
there was an entire absence of comprehensiveness in the fire direction 
of the batteries, because there was no independent central authority 
controlling the handling of the guns. It was as though Napoleon had 
never lived, Wagram and Friedland never been fought, and the Artillery 
of the Guard, “ qui decide la plupart des batailles/’ had never existed. 
But the Americans were early brought to recognise the defects of such 
a system, and worked out their salvation in an original fashion as time 
went on, until methods had been evolved which guaranteed good 
results, and indeed differed little from those which have been proved 
correct by the experiences of war, both of our own and past eras. 
Before we enter more fully, however, into details, such as will help us 
to appreciate the teachings of the battles to which we shall presently 
