622 
ACHIEVEMENTS OF FIELD ARTILLERY. 
The same system of organisation which was gradually evolved in the 
army of the Army of the Potomac was also by degrees developed in 
the others also,, but since that army was the first organised, the largest, 
and the most symmetrical in its composition, it may be cited as an 
example of the others which were modelled on its Hues. 
Soon after the first battle of Ball Run, according to General Tidball, 
the artillery of this army consisted of only nine batteries comprising 39 
guns, 650 men, and 400 horses. By the following March these numbers 
had swelled to 92 batteries, or 520 guns, 12,500 men, and 11,000 horses, 
fully equipped and ready for active service. Of this force 30 batteries 
were regulars and 62 volunteers. Nearly all the regular batteries were 
with this army, but owing to a difficulty in recruiting them, in many 
cases two had been knocked into one. 
In the autumn of 1862 the army was divided into eleven divisions, 
to each of which four batteries were assigned. One of these was a 
regular battery to leaven the mass and serve as an example to the 
others, which were volunteers. The officers and men of the latter came 
fresh from civil employment, and had to learn everything, from the 
very alphabet of military training upwards. 
We are assured that they proved apt scholars, and that in “an 
incredibly short time they were transformed into good serviceable 
batteries.” Each battery was commanded by a Captain, and the senior 
Captain in each division was styled Chief of the Artillery for the division, 
and was supposed to exercise a supervision over the other batteries as 
well as his own, a duty, however, which was very vaguely carried out. 
There were no Field Officers and no staff in this mockery of an 
organisation, which subsequent campaigns soon proved weak and 
inefficient. 
The batteries individually good were but small isolated units, and 
“were attached like excrescences to incongruous commands of infantry.” 
There was no gradation of rank or command, nor was any combined 
action or uniformity of direction possible. 
In addition to these batteries a so-called “Reserve” of artillery, con¬ 
sisting of 18 batteries, was formed, which was sub-divided into three 
brigades, one of which, consisting of four batteries, was for service 
with cavalry. When, after the Peninsular campaign, cavalry were 
formed into distinct bodies, these four batteries were assigned ex¬ 
clusively to them in the manner which obtains amongst European 
armies to-day. 
The artillery “reserve” was a complete organisation in itself, and 
had a distinct commander, staff, and supply department. Its batteries 
being concentrated under the eye of an experienced chief were always 
ready to hand when needed, were more efficient than the others, and 
came to be regarded with pride and confidence throughout the army. 
They constituted in reality what we now term “corps” artillery, and 
became the trump card in the hands of the commanding General, as 
the arm had been in the days of Napoleon, and was again to be in the 
days of Moltke. 
So far from being a reserve, they were almost always first in the 
fight, were constantly in demand, and, especially so in the case of the 
