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achievements of field artillery. 
While, however, it seems just to notice the important assistance 
which the Austrian batteries thus lent to the other arms, it cannot be 
denied that the destructive effect produced by the guns, either of the 
victors or the vanquished, was unequal to what had been expected from 
rifled cannon. The inferiority of materiel on one side, and the faulti¬ 
ness of the tactics on the other, are sufficient to account for this, and 
it must be remembered that the effect which the new improvements 
would produce was at first but little understood, and that ideas were 
as yet in solution on many points connected with the handling of the 
arm. In the next great war we shall find that sounder and clearer 
views have been precipitated, and the principles on which guns should 
be handled well understood, though manufacture is still unequal to com¬ 
pletely realising the intentions of those who stand behind the sights. 
What makes the performances of the artillery in 1870-71 peculiarly 
interesting, however, is the fact that the guns were called upon to 
restore the balance the superiority of the Chassepot had brought about. 
That rifle had an initial velocity of 1328 f.s., as against the needle 
gun’s 990, and was effective at 1800 yards, while the other was no 
longer so beyond 600. The new weapon could be fired ten and a-half 
times per minute, the old one only seven and a-half times, and the 
smaller cartridges of the Chassepot allowed of more rounds being 
carried by the soldier. 
The French guns, on the other hand, were chiefly bronze muzzle- 
loaders of the La Hitte pattern, with a time fuze so faulty that it could 
only act at two ranges, 1500 and 3000 metres, and rendered the shrapnel 
they carried practically useless. The Germans had breech-loading 
guns of better shooting capabilities, and although they had no shrapnel, 
except the inferior one to some extent made use of by the Bavarians, 
they used a percussion fuze, which acted far better than the time fuze 
on the other side. It was not, however, superior materiel so much as 
wiser tactics and better training that enabled their batteries to over¬ 
whelm those of their opponents, and to counteract the effect of their 
deadly rifle. Their guns fired deliberately, ammunition was never 
wasted for the sake of the sound produced, and shots told because each 
was calculated for. The higher direction of the arm was equally 
sound, and a concentrated effect was always sought for. 
The lessons of 1866 had been well digested, and a combination of 
better guns, better tactics, and the confidence engendered by success 
was enough to give them a decided superiority over their rivals when¬ 
ever they met. The glories of the golden prime of Senarmont and 
Druot seem again revived, and masses of guns play a prominent share 
in all descriptions of the battle-fields of 1870. 
Of what may be justly termed artillery achievements, there is in 
consequence a positive embarrass cle richesses in the records of this great 
war, and the arm contributed largely to almost every victory. Yet, 
since it is comparatively easy to succeed when ail the odds are in your 
favour, it may be urged that it is possible to make too much of per¬ 
formances effected under such conditions, and that suspicion lurks 
about deductions drawn with too much confidence from experiences like 
these. 
