THE SUDAN PAST AND PKESENT. 
683 
One glance at this list is sufficient to show what a confused welter of 
disturbance there has been in this unfortunate country, in which, as 
Father Ohrwalder says, “ more than two-thirds of the population have 
disappeared through war, famine, and disease. 
But let us turn for a moment to a brief consideration of the military 
system adopted by the Mahdi, which played such havoc with the Egyp¬ 
tian garrisons. 
Mohammed Ahmed appointed three Khalifas, who were Commanders- 
in-Chief of the three sections into which his army was divided. The 
Mahdi himself had no distinctive insignia—neither flag nor drum ; but 
each Khalifa had his own special distinction : he had his Jehadieh or 
regular troops, his cavalry and lance-bearers, all from the tribe to 
which he himself belonged. Each had his own distinctive flag. The 
chief Khalifa—Abdullah's flag was known as the Raya Zerga, or Black 
Flag ; Ali's, the Raya el Hamra, or Red Flag; Sheriffs, the Raya el 
Hadra, or Green Flag. Each also had his own war-drums made of 
brass, and which were, therefore, called “ nahas 99 in contradistinc¬ 
tion to the ordinary drums known as “ noggara,” which are made of 
wood over which a piece of skin is tightly stretched. 
Each Khalifa was in command of his own section and had numbers 
of emirs under him, all of whom had their different flags made of 
various colours, on which were embroidered the Moslem creed and 
generally a reference to the Mahdi. Each emir was assisted by several 
mukuddums or under officers, and each mukuddum also had his assis¬ 
tant. 
These men can scarcely be called troops. The Mahdi had absolutely 
no knowledge or system of drill; discipline of a wild and rough des¬ 
cription existed it is true, and every individual follower was actuated 
by feelings of the wildest fanaticism ; life was of no account, for one 
and all believed that in dying they should go direct to Paradise, the 
joys of which the Mahdi did not fail to paint in the most glowing 
colours. 
His plan was to attack in overwhelming numbers and to be regard¬ 
less of all loss. At first the use of fire-arms was forbidden because the 
Prophet Mohammed had not used them in his early wars; but a little 
experience soon served to dissolve this notion. 
No sooner had the Mahdi arrived outside the walls of El Obeid, than 
he made a terrific onslaught on the garrison entrenched within the 
government buildings, but was repulsed with a loss of 10,000 men, 
and from this dates an entirely new departure in the conduct of the 
Mahdi's military operations. He now issued strict injunctions that 
his leaders should never order a town to be assaulted in the early stages 
of investment, but should rather wait until famine and disease had 
weakened the resisting powers of the garrison. How effectively he 
pursued this new policy with reference to El Obeid and subsequently 
to Khartum are now matters of history, and in the latter case it is 
very improbable the final assault would have been delivered when it 
was, had not the Mahdi, in desperation and terror of the advancing 
British troops, been driven to risk an action in which in his own words 
he anticipated the loss of half his force. 
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