AN INFANTRY OFFICER’S IDEAS ON OKEHAM PTON. 
705 
a bank, running in an irregular or curving line, some 200 or 300 yards 
in front of the batteries, which would, I think, cause the hostile guns 
to range on it instead of on the artillery in rear. 
I do not at all mean by these remarks that cover should not be 
sought for; on the contrary, a line of guns is a tremendous target when 
in the open, and would, in my opinion, be in great danger even from 
infantry volleys at 1800 yards or so. Cover from view, however, would 
I think, be almost as useful as cover from penetration, and I should 
like to see some sort of light screen carried, which could be hidden 
with heather, gorse, or whatever vegetation would give it the same 
colour as its surroundings. 
I was filled with admiration by the rapidity and accuracy of the 
movements of Field Artillery in taking up and changing their positions, 
though I have seen a good many field-days at Aldershot and elsewhere, 
but I should have liked to have seen a battery or brigade suddenly 
attacked in flank in order to have watched it wheel up to resist the 
sudden onslaught. 
On August 15th, while in action against infantry, each battery at 
Okehampton was in turn attacked by cavalry, and they turned their 
fire upon the new danger with great smartness, but the attack was 
delivered from a direction almost in the front of the battery, and it was 
unnecessary to move any of the guns from their position. Now, I can 
conceive a case of a battery or brigade having, perhaps only tempo¬ 
rarily, one flank undefended during an action, and the enemy’s cavalry 
seizing the opportunity of attacking it there, and I confess I should 
like to have seen the action of the artillery in the case I have sugges¬ 
ted. 
The more practice I saw at positions occupied by dummies the more 
I was convinced of the desirability, nay, the necessity, of the guns fol¬ 
lowing their friendly infantry into the fight as they advance. On 
August 19th, a position was occupied by a dummy army, and attacked 
by a combined force of artillery and infantry. The dummy General 
had occupied advanced posts some 700 yards in front of each flank of 
his main position, and from the point where the guns first opened fire, 
these advanced posts appeared to be almost in line with their friends 
in rear. If the position had been occupied by flesh-and-blood soldiers, 
and if our guns had not advanced as they did when these posts fell into 
the possession of our men, nothing but a marked difference in the 
colour of the uniforms could have prevented our gunners mistaking 
their own infantry for the enemy and opening fire upon them. 
I will conclude my remarks by mentioning one more point which it 
was impossible not to- notice during both the recent courses I have 
attended, and particularly at Okehampton. I allude to the extra¬ 
ordinary zeal and keenness for their business evinced by all ranks of 
the Royal Artillery, from Field Officers to private men. I am proud 
to think, that zeal for the efficiency and improvement of their arm is 
not the monopoly of the gunners, but I am certain it is shown by them 
to a very remarkable degree. 
Chatham, 
21st August , 1892. 
