“ EEYUE MILITAIRE DE L’ETR ANGEE.” 
DECEMBER, 1889—JUNE, 1890. 
“ THE ARTILLERY COMBAT IN SIEGE WARFARE.” 
(ACCORDING TO THE THEORIES OF GENERAL WIEBE.) 
BY 
LIEUT.-COLONEL J. H. G. BROWNE, late R.A. 
(Continued from No. 12, Vol. XVIII.) 
The Aetilleey “Role” during the Siege. 
It lias been seen that General Wiebe admits the necessity of forming in each 
fortified place a special reserve of guns intended to reinforce those of the cover¬ 
ing armament, which are too few in number to prevent the enemy from establishing 
his line of investment. This special reserve might, however, be more accurately 
described as a “ complementary armament.” The General proposes to employ it 
in the following manner. The special reserve should be placed outside the forts, 
because it would be too much exposed inside, and also would be cramped for 
space, whereas in the intervals of the forts it would find the space required for 
deployment and for opposing the enemy with some chance of success. This is 
certainly an excellent principle, and the broad distinction drawn by General 
Wiebe between the guns of the forts and those of the intervals is quite in 
accordance with the requirements of modern warfare. The artillery of the forts 
should on no account be increased beyond what is strictly necessary. The only 
guns which should be placed there are those which will be required to act before 
the siege batteries open fire, or to repulse attacks by open force ; all the others 
should be placed outside in carefully selected positions, and organised like siege 
batteries. The defence has a great advantage in being able to prepare before¬ 
hand the disposition of its artillery, but the exigencies of the moment may 
sometimes necessitate the redistribution of these guns in the intervals between 
the forts. This difficulty, however, will be easily overcome, if care has been 
taken to include in the special reserve some pieces which may be utilised to fill 
up the gaps in the line of battle. This dispersion of the guns between the forts 
makes the service of the batteries somewdiat difficult. The control of the fire, 
supply of ammunition, &c., will be much more complicated than if all the artillery 
were concentrated in the interior of the forts. But this is a difficulty which 
must be foreseen and studied in time of peace. 
The ideas recommended by General Wiebe, wfith regard to placing guns outside 
the permanent works, meet one of General von Sauer’s principal arguments to 
prove the advantages of the attack over the defence. Indeed, von Sauer’s 
12b 
2. VOL. XIX. 
