2 
methods of attack are principally founded upon the bad situation of the artil¬ 
lery in the forts. If these guns are placed in the intervals in batteries like those 
of the besiegers, the two adversaries will meet on equal terms, or possibly on 
terms advantageous to the defenders. But, as has just been said, this dispersion 
of guns necessitates special dispositions for the service of ammunition. General 
Wiebe thinks that it would be a mistake to keep the ammunition for the batteries 
of the intervals inside the permanent works. Small expense magazines should be 
made behind the batteries, taking every precaution to conceal them from the view 
and fire of the enemy. 
Whilst holding the first siege batteries in check, the defenders should soon 
recognise the fronts against which the besiegers will direct their principal attacks ; 
and should not then hesitate to begin the work necessary to. complete their 
protection. Without waiting for the enemy to open fire they will at once bring 
up part of the guns of the general reserve and make emplacements for them in 
case of need. Some of these may not be wanted, but it is better to have too 
many than too few. 
General Wiebe considers it impossible to lay down any rules with regard to the 
proportions of these guns to be brought into line and to be held back in reserve. 
It depends upon the reliance which can be placed on the information obtained 
as to the enemy’s plans. 
As a matter of fact, the defenders are always liable to be deceived with regard 
to the enemy’s intentions, and to bring up guns on a front which will not be. 
attacked, exposing that really threatened. A mistake of this kind would be 
much less important if the Garrison Artillery were more portable, and General 
Wiebe considers that this would be the obvious place for the light howitzer, 
whose creation he advocates. 
“ In some cases,” he says, “ the light howitzers, which we intend especially to 
take part in the decisive combat, would be very useful at the very beginning of the 
struggle, because, thanks to their mobility, they could be brought up rapidly and 
in great numbers upon any points when immediate reinforcement is required. In 
such cases it would be their part to restore the equilibrium of fire, momentarily 
interrupted, until more powerful pieces can gradually come up to replace them.” 
We see that, according to General Wiebe the defenders should reply, stroke for 
stroke almost, to their assailants, and would be wrong in husbanding their 
resources for the final struggle. As soon as an enemy’s battery opens fire, they 
should, if possible, oppose it with a superior number of pieces. 
This principle at first sight seems to be in opposition to that of Vauban, who 
thought that the defenders should not reply to the first batteries of the attack, 
which were too far away to be really dangerous, and that they should reserve 
their fire until after the opening of the second parallel. But this principle is not 
really applicable to the present day because, with modern artillery, the first bat¬ 
teries of the attack will, in spite of their distance, produce such effect that an 
attempt must be made to silence them. But Vauban’s real principle, which was 
to-avoid wasting ammunition, is just as good at the present day as it was 
formerly. 
The Artillery Combat. 
Whilst the besiegers carry out the different operations described above they 
deploy before the front to be attacked the heavy guns intended for the artillery 
combat. The use of the word “ deploy ” once more emphasises the similarity, 
which General Wiebe admits, between the attack of a fortress and a battle in the 
open; as soon as these “batteries of introduction” open fire, the artillery 
combat commences. 
To prevent confusion, it must be remembered that General Wiebe has here in 
view two sorts of batteries. The first, which he calls “batteries of preparation,” 
