3 
are intended to prepare for and cover the deployment of the second, called “bat¬ 
teries of introduction,” because they begin the struggle with the defending 
artillery. 
But, as has already been said, the deployment of these batteries is a very 
delicate operation. To be successful it must be carried out by surprise, taking 
advantage of ground and of the cover of night, and avoiding everything which 
might attract the enemy’s attention. Thus it would be unwise to draw in the 
line of investment at the moment when the construction of these batteries is 
contemplated with a view to covering the working parties better, because there 
would be a danger of attracting the attention of the garrison and of enabling 
them to make their dispositions accordingly. The line of investment should be 
traced so as to render such a movement unnecessary. As soon as the “ batteries 
of preparation ” have done their work, fire should be opened simultaneously 
along the whole line; otherwise the element of surprise would be lost. 
'When the combat has once been entered into, the fire of most of the guns 
should be concentrated upon the real front of attack. Dispersion should be 
avoided, and all the batteries which cannot take part in the combat should be 
dismounted, including, except under very special circumstances, all those used 
for false attacks. 
The “batteries of introduction” will fire on all the defending guns, but 
'especially on those which are most troublesome, replying slowly to the others. 
The besiegers will not hesitate to bring up reinforcements to any points which 
may seem to require it. 
General Wiebe again recommends that the besiegers should try to turn the 
enemy’s flanks, but admits the difficulty of the operation, especially in the case 
of large fortresses of great radius. This idea has been discussed in a previous 
article, but the General here offers some new considerations which may be worth 
noticing. 
He considers that the besiegers would be quite wrong in unduly extending their 
front of attack, under the idea of turning the enemy’s flanks, or of preserving their 
own from a similar danger. The extremities of their line must always be exposed 
to the attacks of neighbouring works, unless they actually invest the whole for¬ 
tress ; an absurd idea not worth discussing. . The only judicious course is tp restrict 
the front on which the batteries are deployed as much as possible at first, as the 
flanks are sure to be sufficiently extended in the course of the siege. The 
minimum length required for this purpose would be about equal to that of the 
portion of the enemy’s position, which it would be necessary to occupy in order 
to make an assault upon the central main-work of the fortress. With the large 
intervals which now separate the detached works of a large fortress, the first 
front of attack might probably be limited to one fort with its two lateral intervals. 
The line of batteries would thus follow the arc of a circle corresponding to that 
of the fortress. The flanks of this line will not be pushed forwards, but on the 
contrary slightly refused, in order to fire directly on the faces of the two col¬ 
lateral forts which command the ground attacked. These flanks should be 
vigorously supported by the batteries of preparation which are best situated for 
the purpose and would not generally be extended beyond the capitals of the 
collateral works, as otherwise they would be too much exposed to the fire of the 
neighbouring intervals. 
These are the dispositions recommended by prudence, and General Wiebe does 
not hesitate to declare them necessary, although they render difficult the envelop¬ 
ment of the flanks of the front of attack, previously laid down as one of the 
conditions of success. But the General is right, and his opinions are all the 
more welcome because at the present time we are tempted to forget all prudence 
in the attack of fortresses. Certain authors, headed by General von Sauer, have 
promulgated such audacious theories on this subject, that we cannot feel surprised 
