7 
The author goes on to say that it will not always be necessary to take one of 
the collateral forts, because if the attack has been vigorously conducted during 
the period of execution the artillery of the place may be silenced, and the fort in 
the centre of the front of attack may be captured by assault. In this case the 
“ decisive combat,” that is to say the envelopment of one of the enemy’s flanks 
by the Siege Artillery, which, according to General Wiebe is characteristic of 
this combat, will not take place. The besiegers should aim at this desirable 
result, by taking advantage of any weakness on the part of the enemy to push 
forwards as rapidly as possible towards the front of attack. 
But they must expect to see all their movements watched and thwarted by the 
garrison. Following the great example of Sebastopol, the General advises the 
defenders to lose no opportunity of taking the offensive whenever circumstances 
appear favourable. But the peculiar and original part of his theories is that 
almost all the proceedings recommended for the attack are, according to him, 
equally applicable for the defence. For some years past, especially since the 
introduction of very powerful projectiles into siege-parks, it has been the fashion 
to consider the defence as in an almost hopeless condition. The most remarkable 
example of this way of looking at the question is to be found in the works of 
General von Sauer, and especially in the last, entitled “ Sudden attacks against 
fortified places, and the method of repulsing them,” in which the first part, 
relating to the attack, gives all the information necessary; while the second part, 
relating to the defence, is so short and unsatisfactory that one feels that the 
author has no confidence in his own precepts, and believes that any fortress 
which is attacked in the way he recommends must necessarily be taken. 
General Wiebe does not fall into a similar exaggeration, he believes that* pro¬ 
longed resistance is always possible. Without doubt the fortress must capitulate 
in the end, but, if the Commandant knows his duties, he can make the assailants 
pay very dearly for their victory, and cause a very serious delay, if not an 
absolute check, in the forward march. 
It may then easily be admitted, in accordance with General Wiebe’s ideas, that 
the defence should follow the same principles as the attack, and should endeavour 
to hold the enemy fast in front while making a turning movement against one of 
his flanks, the execution of this movement being supported by one of the col¬ 
lateral forts. But although such a flank attack might probably bring about the 
important results which the General expects, the manner in which it is to be 
conducted is certainly open to criticism. This will be shown directly. 
The author goes on to say that the conduct of the defenders will be the same 
whether they intend to preserve a defensive attitude, to prepare an offensive 
movement, or to retire from their first position to one nearer to the place. 
They will bring up a sufficient number of pieces to prevent the enemy from 
gaining gronnd, and will endeavour to crush the most annoying of the siege 
batteries by a concentric fire. In front of and around the collateral forts they will 
place counter-batteries to contain the flanks of the besiegers and prevent them 
from advancing. They will also construct batteries a little in rear of these forts 
to protect them against any attempt at direct attack. After their fall these 
batteries will contest possession of the ground which the besiegers require in 
order to deploy for the decisive attack. If these dispositions are taken in time 
the General considers that victory may be obtained by a wise economy of. forces 
where practicable, by fighting to the last at the points where the enemy may be 
long held in check, by following his movements and profiting by his faults. 
There is no doubt that the period of execution may last a long time, and as 
long as neither of the adversaries shows signs of exhaustion no decisive results 
can be expected; everything depends upon their resources. But eventually the 
situation will change ; resources and material are not inexhaustible, especially on 
the side of the garrison, and even the highest state of ‘ moral ’ will eventually 
deteriorate. Then the two sides should endeavour to estimate, as accurately as 
