406 
AETILLEEY IN COAST DEFENCE, 
A question to be considered is whether the fire of the shore guns 
should be concentrated on a few ships or distributed over the whole 
fleet; generally speaking the best method would appear to be, to con¬ 
centrate on a few ships, preferably those at shortest range or which 
had succeeded in causing most annoyance, with the greater number of 
guns; distributing the fire of the rest sufficiently to cause a feeling of 
insecurity and consequent loss of accuracy ; it would certainly be pre¬ 
ferable, whilst the fleet was in motion, to totally disable one ship rather 
than to inflict slight damage on several. 
Whenever two or more forts can bring a cross-fire to bear on a ship, 
she should be attacked by those forts, as it will prevent her taking her 
station in such a position as to be secured from dangerous hits. 
A large part of the secondary and movable armaments should be 
used to keep down the fire of the auxiliary armament of the ships 
(quick-firing and machine guns) which would be directed at the em¬ 
brasures or ports to prevent the guns being worked. 
High-angle fire from guns of the primary armament specially mounted, 
and from howitzers of the movable armament in concealed positions, 
would be especially dangerous to ships at anchor; and, when a suffi¬ 
cient number of them are available, it would perhaps be advantageous 
to withdraw the gunners from the direct-fire guns as soon as the fire 
from the ships began to tell, until the howitzers had succeeded in 
somewhat reducing that fire. 
Ships can make no effective reply to this kind of attack unless they 
have vessels specially constructed to carry howitzers ; and even then, 
since the vessels must be visible from some point on shore, while the 
batteries may be so placed as to be invisible from the sea, it is difficult 
too see how the ships could observe their fire and correct their ranges 
with anything like the accuracy attainable by the shore batteries. 
Should the enemy’s fleet only wish to bombard the fortress with a 
view to producing moral effect, or to divert the attention of the de¬ 
fenders from some other operation which is being simultaneously 
attempted; such as landing troops, destroying mines or other obstruc¬ 
tions, or the attempt by other vessels to force a passage; the ships 
engaged in the bombardment will not commit themselves to a serious 
engagement, and, in order to minimise the risk of being crippled, will 
keep on the move. 
In view of the fact that accurate fire can now be directed on objects 
in motion, we should be able to compel such vessels to keep at so long 
a range that their fire cannot be very accurate or much to be dreaded. 
It should be noted, in considering the kind of attack to which any 
coast fortress is liable, that the amount of risk to which attacking 
vessels would be willing to expose themselves, would depend in great 
measure on the distance from their base, and the possibility or other¬ 
wise of their being attacked on their way there to refit, by hostile 
vessels; the further off the base and the greater the probability of such 
attack, the less likely are they to run serious risk of being crippled in 
attacking coast defences. 
A bombardment by vessels in motion would, as has been said, be 
usually resorted to for the purpose of covering some other operation; 
