408 
ARTILLERY IN COAST DEFENCE. 
or painting lines on the platforms against which the trucks, or wheel 
and trail, can be brought at each round, so that the guns will point in 
the required direction; or laying-back points may be established. 
Great accuracy of laying for line is not however necessary. A pre¬ 
viously agreed upon signal would show when the defended area was 
clear of the defending boats, when a rapid fire of shrapnel (and case 
shot from guns within case shot range) would be opened. 
Should an attempt be made by a squadron to force the passage of a 
channel, whether under cover of bombardment or not, every effort 
would be made to so disable the leading vessel or vessels as to cause a 
check in the advance of the squadron, and detain them under fire of the 
forts. An instance of the effect such a check would have, occurred 
during the battle of Mobile Bay, 5th August, 1864. 
The Federal fleet consisting of 14 wooden vessels and 4 monitors 
under Admiral Farragut succeeded on that day in passing Fort Morgan 
which defended the entrance to the bay. The deep water channel 
was partially blocked by torpedoes so that vessels would have to pass 
close under the guns of the fort. The fleet advanced in two lines, the 
wooden vessels, lashed together in pairs, forming one line, and the 
monitors the other; these being on the right of the wooden vessels 
and between them and Fort Morgan. When opposite the fort the 
leading monitor the “ Tecumseh,” bearing too much to the left was 
sunk by a torpedo, and the alteration in her course also caused the 
leading wooden vessel to come on to the line of torpedoes, on per¬ 
ceiving which she stopped, thus throwing the whole line into confusion 
and checking their advance under the guns of the fort ; the check 
lasted about ten minutes, till the flag-ship taking the lead passed, in 
safety over the torpedoes, and the whole line straightening out again, 
passed beyond the fire of the fort. 
Reports by Federal officers show that the damage and loss of men 
caused by the fire of the fort, and of the Confederate gunboats, during 
the check was very heavy, and they state that had it lasted a few min¬ 
utes longer the attempt would probably have ended in disaster. 
In resisting such an attack, then, it seems that the best policy would 
be to attack the leading ship, or ships, with every gun that can bear 
on them; and that the object shonld be to attack the “ vitals ” of the 
ship rather than to inflict losses on the crew or damage the armament. 
In a lecture 1 Captain May, R.N. states “that probably the oldest 
ironclads as being the least valuable, would be employed to lead the 
line;” this should make the task of stopping them easier for us, as such 
ships are not usually provided with such heavy armour as more modern 
vessels. 
High-angle fire, on account of its comparative inaccuracy, is not of 
much account against vessels in rapid motion; but where a channel 
has a narrow part, such that a vessel passing through must keep 
approximately to the centre of it, and therefore at a known range, 
salvos might be fired at her as she passed that point with good effect. 
While the main effort should be directed to stopping the leading 
1 Published in R.A.I. “Proceedings.” 
