488 
GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1892. 
Fir© Discip¬ 
line training 
unnecessary 
in the days 
ofS.B.guns. 
Its modern 
necessity is 
due to the 
altered cir¬ 
cumstances 
of artillery 
fighting. 
German 
artillery 
training 
after cam¬ 
paign of 
1860. 
mitted as being likely to afford the best guarantee for the maintenance 
of Fire Discipline in a battery of Horse or Field Artillery. 
In the days of smooth-bore guns batteries were rarely brought into 
action at a greater range than 800 yards. 1 2 Even at this range the 
effect was moral more than material. Decisive results were only 
obtained when the guns were advanced to case shot distance. Under 
these circumstances the necessity for what is now understood by Fire 
Discipline was not apparent. To lead bis battery into a good position 
in the thick of the fight was the first and last duty of its commander. 
With the detailed conduct of the fire there was no cause to interfere. 
It was all straightforward. To get off as many rounds as possible at 
point blank range was the object of the men serving each gun. There 
never was any question as to the position of the target, or as to its 
nature and distance from the battery, nor was there any difficulty with 
regard to observation of fire. 
The circumstances of artillery fighting are now altered. The intro¬ 
duction of the rifled small arm marked the beginning of the change. 
At the battle of Inkerman the Russian batteries were not advanced 
nearer than 1200 yards to the British infantry. 3 The forward tactics 
of Austerlitz, of Friedland, and of Wagram, were no longer possible. 
The rifled field gun, which was first used in the Italian Campaign of 
1859, carried the change a step further. At Solferino 3 the French 
batteries opened fire at the previously unheard of range of 2500 yards. 
The war of 1866 found the Prussian artillery unprepared for its new 
role . The guns seldom came into action at the right time and place. 
When they did get into line their fire was ineffective. There had been 
no training in ranging, in observation of effect, and in discipline of 
fire. 
When peace was concluded German artillery officers applied them¬ 
selves to the work of reform. The spirit of that work and the nature 
of the reforms which were made have been so graphically described 4 
by Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen that they need not be 
further referred to here. Then were worked out those experiments in 
ranging and establishing the fuze for shrapnel which have since been 
formulated into a system. Then it was that German batteries were 
taught not only how to shoot, but how to manoeuvre so as to give full 
effect to the lessons of the practice ground. The close connection 
between tactics and shooting became a marked feature of German 
artillery training between 1866 and 1870. Instruction in Fire Dis- 
1 At Austerlitz Napoleon formed his lines with the artillery placed between the Brigade 
intervals side by side with the infantry battalions. At Friedland General Senarmont’s guns 
opened fire at 600 yards, and subsequently advanced to 250 yards. At Wagram the big battery 
of 100 guns, which was formed to cover the attack of Macdonald’s Column, was not deployed 
till within 600 yards of the Austrian line. At Borodino the artillery of Key’s, Davoust’s, 
and Murat’s Corps (200 guns in all) was formed along the Semenoffskoi ravine at case shot 
distance from the Russian batteries. 
2 Todleben attributes the ill success of the Russian artillery to the distance which the guns 
were compelled to keep from the British infantry fire.—Russel’s translation, “Defence of Sebas¬ 
topol,” p. 193. 
3 “ Study of Italian Campaign of 1859,” by Major F. Miller, R.A. 
4 “Letters on Artillery,” by Prince Kraft Zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen 
Colonel Walford, R.A. Chap. VIII, 
translated by Lieut.» 
