GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1892. 
489 
cipline was not confined to the gun park, nor even to the practice 
ground, hut was especially insisted on in the field. It is perfectly 
true, as Colonel Maurice has recently stated, 1 2 “that the German artil¬ 
lery had never fired off a gun which had not been properly laid at an 
assigned object with the range determined, the nature of projectile 
declared, and the fuze to burst the shell so far fixed that had it been 
necessary actually to fire in earnest every man would have gone through 
an almost exactly similar experience.” 
The value of this peace training received practical proof in the war 
of 1870, when, owing to good handling and good shooting, the German 
artillery achieved successes as conspicuous as were its failures in 1866* 
The Emperor Napoleon III. attributed his defeat at Sedan mainly to 
the superiority of the German over the French artillery. Not less 
decided was the opinion of the German General Staff as expressed in 
the official account of the war. 3 “ The German artillery at the battle 
of Sedan produces an especially grand and decisive effect.” What 
it is important in this connection to notice is that the cause of this 
success was due to the painstaking efforts made by German artillery 
officers to train their men in the practice of Fire Discipline during 
peace. “ I could hardly have believed,” writes Prince Kraft, in allusion 
to a splendid instance of Fire Discipline on the part of a battery at 
the battle of Gravelotte, “ that the instruction given in peace would 
have borne such excellent fruit in spite of the excitement of action.” 
Much has happened since 1870 to increase the necessity for Fire 
Discipline. Every Continental country, including England, has re¬ 
armed its artillery. The range of field guns has been lengthened; 
their accuracy and shooting power improved. The destructive effect 
of projectiles is greater, and the means of firing them more certain. 
In our own service a telescopic sight has been introduced which adds 
to the power of the gun, but also to the difficulty of training the layer. 
The invention of smokeless powder has removed a formidable obstacle 
to the sustained fire of large masses of concentrated guns. The fire 
of artillery will now be more continuous, entailing a heavier strain 
on the nerve and endurance of the personnel . The supply of am¬ 
munition is a problem of uppermost difficulty. The proportion of 
guns to infantry has been raised, and according to expectation 
artillery will be brought on to future fields of battle in far larger 
numbers than has ever before been the case. All these developments 
1 “ War,” by Colonel J. F. Maurice, c.b., R.A. 
2 “ So annihilating was the fire of the artillery that the French were scarcely capable of any 
organised resistance when the German infantry towards 3 p.m. moved forward.”—German Official 
Account of the War of 1870-71. 
The Russian, Baron Seddeler, in allusion to the action of the German artillery during the 
campaign wrote as follows : — 
“ The artillery gained an independence which even exceeded the boldest aspirations of artil¬ 
lerists. It is scarcely possible to have effected more than was done by the artillery. . . . 
The numerous victories must be ascribed to the German artillery.” 
The Austrian, Major Rosinich, wrote very much to the same effect in his report on the war. 
“ The principal share in the conquest of the French in all battles must be ascribed to the German 
artillery.” 
Results 
obtained in 
campaign of 
1870-1. 
Increased 
necessity for 
Fire Discip¬ 
line training 
since 1870-71 
