GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1892. 
491 
Schemes have been frequently put forward on paper 1 2 for altering 
the size of the unit. It has been proposed, for instance, to create a 
big battery of 16 guns divided into four 4-gun troops. This battery 
would be commanded by a Lieut.-Colonel or a senior Major. Besides 
two additional Majors to “ superintend,” the Commanding Officer 
would have as assistants an Adjutant, a Riding-Master, and a Quarter- 
Master. The proposed organisation would thus be assimilated to that 
of a regiment of cavalry or battalion of infantry. Those who advocate 
this system do so on the ground that it would consolidate control, 
facilitate administration, and secure uniformity. 
Reflection will show, however, that this and similar schemes are 
based on a misconception of the principles which should determine the 
size of the unit. Questions of this nature are settled by practice not 
by theory. The tactical needs of the case must be first considered. 
What is the greatest number of guns that can be controlled and 
manoeuvred by one hand and one voice ? The experience of war has 
fixed this number at six. No larger number of guns provided with 
the requisite supply of ammunition can be brought collectively and 
simultaneously into action in the same place under the executive com¬ 
mand of the same leader. Symmetry, uniformity, and convenience of 
administration are minor considerations, which must be made to fit in 
as best they can with the tactical necessities of the case. It is because 
they have been placed first in the schemes alluded to that such pro¬ 
posals have gone no further than the paper on which they are printed. 
The individuality of the battery is a factor of extreme importance 
in the maintenance of Fire Discipline. A battery should be self- 
supporting. There should be no leaning on outside help. The 
extraneous assistance of special instructors is to be deprecated. A 
cardinal characteristic of Fire Discipline is that it must be self-taught. 
If a battery cannot teach itself no one else can do so, and it is certain 
that Fire Discipline will be found in no battery where it is not the 
outcome of internal exertions made within the ranks of the battery 
itself. 
The administrative unity of the battery is another point of impor¬ 
tance. It is sometimes said that a Battery Commander is too heavily 
weighted with administrative work, and that if relieved of this he 
would have more time for the duties of executive command. The 
expediency of such relief, however, is exceedingly doubtful. Command 
and administration go hand in hand together. Administrative 
responsibility increases the labour, but strengthens the hands of the 
Commander. The close relations into which he is brought with his 
officers and men enable him to personally influence those under his 
command in a way which would not otherwise be possible. 3 The 
direct bearing which such influence has on the maintenance of discipline 
1 Three such schemes differing in detail hut agreeing in principle are now in possession of the 
writer. 
2 The circumstances are less favourable in a regiment of cavalry or battalion of infantry where, 
owing to the large size of the unit, the personal influence of the Commander is less direct, and 
has to work through subordinate channels before it reaches the individual soldier, 
Consider¬ 
ation of pro¬ 
posals to 
increase the 
size of the 
unit. 
False views 
upon which 
these pro¬ 
posals are 
based. 
Individual¬ 
ity of the 
battery an 
important 
factor in the 
maintenance 
of Fire 
Discipline. 
Administra¬ 
tive unity of 
the battery. 
