560 
ACHIEVEMENTS OP FIELD ARTILLERY. 
path, of escape open to the French. The Bavarian General made a last 
and despairing effort on his right, but two battalions of the old Guard 
were available to be sent against him, and were strong enough to bring 
his advance to a stand-still. Finally Wrede was compelled to give up 
all hope of cutting off his great antagonist, and was glad to find security 
for his shattered army under the cannon of Hanau. 
Thus a General who appreciated the power of artillery was able once 
more to bring victory round to his side by a judicious yet bold handling 
of the arm, and Hanau undoubtedly may be quoted to illustrate what 
guns thrown with prompt decision into the battle are capable of effect- 
i ng. 
We might well wind up the era of Napoleon with this incident 
from a battle not as widely celebrated as many, but which must yet 
ever interest artillerymen on account of the part played in it by their 
arm, but ere we close this portion of our subject it may be right to 
notice the effect which was produced at Waterloo by the great battery 
of 76 guns which prepared the way for the attack of D’Erlon's corps 
on the British left centre. All accounts of the battle have borne 
eloquent testimony to the terribly destructive effect of these guns, and 
their performances deserve mention, because assuredly it was not owing 
to any lack on the part of their artillery that the attack of the French 
was repulsed. Great, however, as was the execution they did, it can 
hardly be said that they exerted a decisive effect on even a phase of the 
battle, because the attack they immediately supported failed, and we 
would here only speak of feats performed by guns such as left an 
unmistakeable trace behind them on the fortunes of the day. It may 
also excite surprise that nothing has been brought forward from the 
great struggle in the Peninsula, of which the artillery are as justly 
proud as any of their comrades of the other arms, in pages which are 
written to recount the achievements of guns. The truth is that, although 
the support given by batteries was often most opportune and valuable, 
the history of that campaign does not furnish us, except in one instance, 
with any brilliant strokes effected by them such as are sufficiently 
memorable to be recorded in the same category with those with which 
we have just dealt. 
Artillery is an expensive force to equip, requires time to train, and 
is especially vulnerable as regards its mobility in action. Just as the 
great British leader was obliged by administrative and economical 
considerations, and the relation in which he was placed with regard to 
the Government at home, to spare his cavalry as much as possible, and 
refrain often from throwing it into the scale, even when it was most 
evident that decisive result could only thus be reaped, so it was with 
the other mounted arm, in which he was weak, and which he felt he 
could not afford to risk. 
Just for the same reasons that the pursuit was never vigorously 
pressed by Wellington, it was that his guns were not handled in the 
bold and independent manner which, if it endangers their safety, 
at least assures that of the other arms, and most often leads to decisive 
success. A military despot with the whole resources of the State at 
his back may hazard strokes which a General whose minutest actions 
