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ACHIEVEMENTS OF FIELD ARTILLERY. 
At the battle of Albuera, 16th May, 1811, the “most sanguinary and 
awful combat that has been fought in the Peninsula,” “D” Troop, 1 2 
which consisted of only four guns, was in the very thick of the melee ; 
and thou the guns were repeatedly charged or ridden through by the 
French cavalry, their attack was checked at a most critical part of the 
battle by the effective fire which they brought to bear. 
Marshal Beresford, in his despatch, says—“ The four guns of the 
Horse Artillery, commanded by Captain Lefebure” (with whom also 
was Captain Whinyates) “ did great execution on the enemy’s cavalry.” 
It is thus that Brigadier-General B. B. Long, 3 in a letter dated the 
26th June, 1811, from the bivouac near Vicente, speaks of the services 
of this troop, “ D.” “ The dispersion of our cavalry scarcely left us 
400 or 500 British at any point, and these, with two regiments of 
Spaniards, were all we had to offer by way of resistance to their numer¬ 
ous and overwhelming columns. The ground, however, favoured us, 
and the Horse Artillery did its duty with brilliant effect. The enemy 
lost a great number of men, and from 400 to 500 horses, by the operation 
of this arm alone!” 
Nor can we leave unnoticed the part played by the artillery at 
Vittoria, the only triumph of the arm during the war, and the battle 
most decisive in its results of any which our army gained in Spain— 
even if no deeds that fascinate the imagination, such as the giant 
blows of Senarmont or Lauriston, can be recorded from that fight. 
It has been whispered that the Duke of Wellington did not understand 
artillery tactics thoroughly, and failed somewhat to appreciate how the 
arm might best be turned to account. It is at any rate certain that 
we do not find guns employed in masses during the Peninsular cam¬ 
paigns except at this battle—a fact, however, which we are rather 
inclined to attribute to the causes which we have already mentioned 
than to any tactical prejudices of the Duke’s. It is, however, an odd 
coincidence that in the battle where our batteries most distinguished 
themselves, and where their effect was due to the manner in which 
they were employed in masses, their concentration was due rather to 
good fortune than good guidance on his part, just as had been the case 
with Daun at Torgau. 
“ The nature of the country, 3 and want of roads, was the means of 
throwing a large proportion of our artillery together, away from their 
divisions, which I availed myself of, and by employing them in masses 
it had a famous effect. This was adjoining the great road to Vittoria; 
and the French brought all the artillery they could to oppose our 
advance, so that the cannonade on one spot was very vigorous. In 
none of our Peninsular battles have we ever brought so much cannon 
into play ; and it was so well directed that the French were generally 
obliged to retire ere the infantry could get at them. There were few 
or no instances of the bayonet being used during the day.” 
1 j) ” Troop had only four guns at .Albuera, the other two being still dismounted at Lisbon. 
It may be as well to remind our readers also that this Troop, which was reduced in 1816, is in no 
way connected with the battery which at present bears the same letter. 
2 Commanding the brigade of cavalry to which “C” Troop was attached. 
:j See a letter from Colonel Dickson quoted in Duncan’s “ History of the Royal Artillery,” 
Vol. II. 
