6 
wood which masks the battle-field, to obtain a rapid superiority over the enemy. 
But besides this, some of the advantages which the General claims for the attack 
seem to be very problematical. Granted that the shrapnel for plunging fire, 
being of larger calibre than that for direct fire, produces a greater cloud of 
smoke in bursting, thus rendering observation more clear and easy; granting 
again that the enemy’s positions will be very visible, which renders them liable 
to be struck with greater certainty ; still it does not seem evident why the “ high 
angles of descent ” and the “ low velocities ” offer special advantages to the 
assailants. Some observations on this point would not have been superfluous. 
It has just been seen that General von Sauer makes the same objection to field 
fortifications which he does to permanent, viz.:—that of being too visible. “ Field 
works,” he says, “are clearly distinguished from the surrounding ground by 
their slopes of freshly thrown up earth, and there is seldom sufficient time to 
mask them. Now nothing is more favourable for finding the range than the 
existence of a very visible parapet, and nothing will demoralise the men placed 
behind this parapet more than a feeling of the uselessness, or even of the 
danger, of the shelter thrown up at so great expense. These parapets have little 
to fear from direct fire as long as they are not taken obliquely or in reverse, but 
with plunging fire the conditions are very different.” 
Long ago General von Sauer maintained that permanent works offered a 
favourable mark for siege guns from their conspicuous outlines, and he now 
asserts the same of temporary fortifications. This statement is certainly too 
sweeping. We cannot but think that with smokeless powder the defender will 
be able to conceal the position of his works better than formerly if they only 
make a reasonable use of natural cover and of the resources of field fortification. 
Indeed, if the defence is conducted with any sort of ability, the reconnaissance 
of the positions will be very difficult for the attack, and will probably take more 
time than formerly, because there will be no smoke to give valuable indications. 
With regard to the statement that the defence has little to fear from direct fire, 
unless its parapets are taken obliquely or in reverse, this is not true since the 
introduction of torpedo shells into the equipment of Field Artillery. These 
shells will destroy earthen parapets without having recourse to plunging fire, 
and thus expose the men behind them to shrapnel fire. 
Again General von Sauer is so convinced of the superiority of plunging fire, 
that lie even claims that it will be more efficacious than direct fire against the 
borders of woods and boundaries of villages. We do not know upon what 
experiences this opinion is based, but it is contrary to the German Infantry Regu¬ 
lations on the duties of pioneers in the field, which recommend that the defenders 
should be placed from 100 to 200 metres in front of the boundary of the wood or 
village “ in order to withdraw themselves as much as possible from the destruc¬ 
tive effects of artillery fire.” 
Convinced of the excellence of the arguments which he has produced to prove 
the insufficiency of direct fire, General von Sauer concludes from them that the 
assailant ought to make a very extensive use of high-angle fire. He maintains 
that direct fire cannot drive the enemy from his position or shake him sufficiently 
to enable the attacking columns to carry the lines without heavy loss, as he will 
be in comparative safety either in shelters in rear of the works or when seated 
at the foot of the interior slope, whereas high-angle fire can render both the 
parapets and shelters untenable. 
It is quite true that direct fire produces little effect against troops seated at 
the foot of the interior slope, but as soon as the men stand up to fire circum¬ 
stances are quite altered. It will, of course, be said that the tactics of the 
defenders is to reverse their fire until the enemy’s artillery is obliged to cease 
firing so as to avoid hitting the troops, which have approached within 200 or 300 
jnetres of the works. But this is a difficult moment to seize, and frequent errors 
