3 
But the “ Mannlicher,” in common with all repeating rifles, has the great 
disadvantage of leading to the consumption of an enormous quantity of ammu¬ 
nition at the time when it becomes more and more difficult to replace. This is 
especially the case with raw levies like those of Colonel Canto. The Congressists, 
although they had from 180 to 200 rounds apiece, ran short of ammunition after 
firing for an hour-and-a-half, at the very time when their consumption of ammu¬ 
nition should have increased. This serious inconvenience is difficult to provide 
against. According to the experience of the Chilians, it is impossible, at any 
rate when acting on the offensive, to bring up cartridges from the ammunition 
reserve to the skirmishing line, as the intensity of fire prevents any regular 
system of communication. The supply of ammunition which could be obtained 
from the killed and wounded would be very insufficient, and would not always be 
found where most required. 
After this combat of Concon, part of the Congressists remained for more than 
12 hours with only five or six rounds apiece —or almost completely disarmed. 
It had been found impossible to make a fresh distribution over night, and the 
ammunition reserve did not come up for some hours. 
In spite of this drawback, the Reichswehr considers that the great superiority 
of the Mannlicher over the other rifles was clearly established. Its appearance 
on the battle-field might be compared to that of the needle-gun at the combat of 
Nachod in 1866. The advantage of the repeating rifle was again shown at 
Placilla on August 28th. 
After his defeat at Concon, Barbosa retreated upon Vina del Mar on the north 
side of Valparaiso, where he was joined by a reinforcement of 4500 men who 
had already come up from the south. Colonel Canto advanced directly on Val¬ 
paraiso on the morning of the 22nd August, but, finding the enemy’s position 
too strong to be taken by a coup-de-main , he put off the attack till the next day. 
On the 23rd the armed flotilla opened fire on Fort Callao at 2500 metres, while 
the Congressist artillery commanded the heights, but the Balmacedist artillery 
proved the stronger, and in the meanwhile Colonel Canto had changed his plans. 
Instead of attacking Valparaiso on the north side, where he would have to deploy 
his troops under the fire of the forts, he determined to confine himself to a 
demonstration in that direction, and then to march upon Quilpue with the view 
of capturing the heights which command Valparaiso on the south-east. 
Thanks to the precautions taken and to the inactivity of the enemy’s cavalry, 
this movement was successfully carried out. On the night of the 24th August 
the Congressist advanced-guard cut the Valparaiso-Santiago railway in spite of 
the arrival of an armour-plated train, and Colonel Canto, continuing his move¬ 
ment, occupied Quilpue, and there halted till the morning. Balmaceda was not 
aware of the movement until the morning of the 26th. He then directed his 
troops upon Placilla to the south-east of Valparaiso, which they reached on the 
evening of the 26th, and there received reinforcements, which brought their 
strength up to about 10,000 men. 
Colonel Canto, on receiving this intelligence, made two night marches on the 
25th and 26th, preferring the cold of the night to the heat of the day. In spite 
of the difficult nature of the country to be traversed, his vanguard reached Las 
Cadinas, a farm about two miles from Placilla, at 3 a.m. on the morning of the 
27th. The rest of the troops followed, and Colonel Canto devoted the rest of 
the day to preparing for a decisive attack on the morrow. The ranks of the 
Congressists had been swelled by deserters and prisoners to a total of nearly 12,000 
men, while the Balmacedists only numbered from 9000 to 10,000, still placed under 
the orders of Barbosa and Al$erreca, whose views were seldom in agreement. 
The defenders occupied a front of about two miles, most of their guns being- 
placed in the centre, while the infantry on their front and flanks crowned slopes 
whose very steepness, while it rendered them difficult to climb, prevented the 
84b 
