4 
approaches from being effectively swept by the defender’s fire. The cavalry was 
in reserve behind the centre, while one battery was on the extreme right, where 
Balmaceda seems to have expected the principal attack, in order to cut him off 
from his point of disembarkation at Laguna. The attack began all along the 
line on the morning of August 28th. Balmaceda, who remained strictly on the 
defensive, sent some of his reserves up to support his right, but in the meanwhile 
his left was driven in despite the fire of his artillery and several cavalry charges. 
In the centre the Congressists made slow progress, but on the enemy’s right they 
were held in check, until Colonel Canto, judging the moment favourable, ordered 
his cavalry to charge. The cavalry climbed the steep slopes and issuing suddenly 
upon the already shaken infantry completely routed them. Barbosa was killed 
in trying to check the enemy with 100 horsemen, and Al^erreca vainly attempted 
to prolong the struggle. At half-past ten the battle was over; all the Bal- 
macedist artillery and 3000 prisoners fell into the hands of the Congressists. 
The latter lost from 1400 to 1600 men in killed and wounded ; while the loss of 
the Balmacedists is variously estimated at from 800 to 1500. 
This disaster finished the campaign ; the Balmacedists made no attempt to 
prolong it, and on the same day Colonel Canto entered Valparaiso, which was 
only seven or eight miles from the field of battle. 
The writer of the article makes the following remarks with reference to the 
second part of this campaign. 
(1.) Night marches were frequently resorted to. These were rendered almost 
necessary in consequence of the rapid variations in temperature between daytime 
and night, which occur in the climate of Chili. 
(2.) The cavalry did little outside the field of battle, owing to the nature of 
the country and their own defective organisation. On the other hand, they found 
several opportunities of acting on the battle-field, and the decisive defeat of the 
Balmacedists at Placilla is largely attributed to the action of Colonel Canto’s 
cavalry. 
(3.) The artillery, weak as compared with the other arms, appears to have 
done less at Placilla than at Concon. It was composed of mountain guns, and 
the conformation of the ground was unfavourable to the movement of that arm. 
(4.) Attention has already been called to the important effect produced by 
the “ Mannlicher ” rifle, with which one-third of the Congressists infantry was 
armed. 
(5.) It would seem that frontal attacks are becoming more and more difficult, 
as the armament of troops progresses. At Placilla the frontal attack against the 
Balmacedist right could make no sensible progress until their left had been 
driven in. It may be assumed that this difficulty in making a direct attack would 
have been increased if the Balmacedists had been armed with repeating rifles. 
(6.) The above remarks must be discounted to some extent in consequence of 
the composition of the contending forces. The Balmacedists had the best 
trained men, but were badly organised and led, while the Congressists had the 
advantage in the point of armament. But the proportion of losses shows that 
courage was not wanting on either side, and real importance may be attached to 
this eight days’ campaign. 
