I 
14 Wisconsin state agricultural society. 
mouth of that river is filling up at the rate of about 500 square 
acres, three feet deep, every year, that its deltas even now for¬ 
bid the passage of sea-worthy vessels—when we look these facts 
in the face, and find that all these modes of exit are inadequate to 
our wants, we are appalled, and naturally enquire “ Is there no 
balm in Gilead?” I think I can affirmatively answer that ques¬ 
tion, and will here introduce my statistical witnesses: 
Take the states of Illinois, Nebraska, Iowa, Minnesota and 
Wisconsin, which would be likely to ship their products at either 
Milwaukee or Chicago, especially the crop of corn. In 1872, the 
corn crop of these states yielded 228,370,000 bushels. Allowing 
75,000,000 bushels for home consumption, and it would leave 148,- 
000,000 bushels surplus for export. I find there were shipped 
from Mdwaukee and Chicago (1872), 49,260,990 bushels (only 
5,401,044 by rail), leaving unshipped (except what may have gone 
by other routes), the immense amount of 99,110,010 bushels. 
In the same states the wheat crop yielded 145,215,860 bushels. 
Allowing 30,000,000 bushels for home consumption (about 5 
bushels to each person), and it would leave 115,215,860 bushels 
X 
tor export, and yet, (reducing flour to wheat), there were shipped 
from Milwaukee and Chicago, 67,888,971 bushels, leaving an un- 
exported surplus of near 50,000,000 bushels, except what may 
have been shipped from other lake ports, of which I have no data. 
We have a right to suppose that all the water craft and railways 
have as much as they can do, and yet if we were to send this vast 
surplus of corn alone by rail to New York, the first thing we 
would do would be to secure the services of one of the great trunk 
lines. We would approach the master of transportation and tell 
him that some foreign war had created a sudden demand for corn 
and that we had 100,000,000 bushels to ship, and desired to send 
it forthwith, while the price was up. He would probably s^y to 
us that he would do the best he could, that the whole freight ser¬ 
vices of the road should be at our command, and that the best he 
could do, after borrowing all the spare box cars from all the other 
roads, would be to give us 6 trains a day and 20 cars to the train. 
This would hardly give room for passenger and way trains, still . 
he would risk it. This we would consider very obliging, and 
with slate and pencil we would proceed to see how long it would 
